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THE TWO-HEADED DRAGON OF SITING AND 
CLEANING UP HAZARDOUS WASTE DUMPS: CAN 
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES OR MEDIATION SLAY THE 
MONSTER? 
Bradford C. Mank* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
America faces a serious hazardous waste crisis. 1 First, cleanups 
of abandoned sites have proceeded at a slow pace, especially where 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is in 
charge of the cleanup project.2 Second, it has become difficult to site 
new waste disposal facilities because of "Not-In-My-Back-Yard" 
(NIMBY) opposition, which persists despite state statutes designed 
to preempt local land use bans. 3 Third, because many existing in-
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. J.D., 1987, Yale Law School; B.A., 
1983, Harvard University. I wish to thank Joe Tomain, John Applegate, and Paul Caron for 
helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article. I also thank the Center for the Study of 
Dispute Resolution at the University of Cincinnati College of Law for financial assistance 
under grants from the Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management, the 
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, and Browning-Ferris Industries. All conclusions and 
any errors are my own and in no way should be attributed to any of the funding groups. 
1 This Article uses the definition of "hazardous waste" found in Subtitle C of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, as amended by the Hazardous and Solid 
Waste Amendments of 1984 and subsequent EPA regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988); 
40 C.F.R. §§ 260-62, 264-66, 270-71, 280 (1990); see also Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of 
RCRA: The "Mind-Numbing" Provisions of the Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 
21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,254, 10,256-61 (May 1991). See generally Jeffrey M. 
Gaba, Solid Waste and Recycled Materials Under RCRA: Separating Chaff from Wheat, 16 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 623 (1989) (examining complexities of definition of "solid waste" under RCRA). 
2 See infra notes 91, 98, 128-30 and accompanying text. 
S Neighborhood groups often oppose solid waste as well as hazardous waste facilities. See 
infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. For a discussion of NIMBY opposition to hazardous 
waste facilities, see generally Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National Problem, 35 S.D. 
L. REV. 198 (1990); A. Dan Tarlock, Siting New or Expanded Treatment, Storage, or Disposal 
Facilities: The Pigs in the Parlors of the 1980s, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 429 (1984). 
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dustrial and commercial sites have expensive contamination prob-
lems, developers frequently exploit virgin land, a misguided practice 
in light of the finite amount of irreplaceable pristine land left in the 
United States. 4 
This Article proposes that communities encourage developers to 
reuse or at least remediate abandoned contaminated sites by prom-
ising not to oppose the siting of a new waste disposal facility if a 
developer remediates a contaminated site in the community. In par-
ticular, two types of sites are suitable for remediation and reuse: so-
called "orphan" sites-abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites that 
now bankrupt, dissolved, or unidentifiable private firms once 
owned5-and municipal solid waste (MSW) landfills, which many local 
governments may be liable for cleaning up pursuant to the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA).6 
The EPA has a policy of encouraging private parties to remediate 
orphan sites, but the policy does not go far enough. 7 Moreover, 
commentators have proffered proposals to encourage private parties 
to remediate waste sites, but each proposal has significant flaws. 
For example, direct economic and tax incentives, although appealing 
in theory, are unlikely to find political support. 8 Similarly, imposing 
mandatory exactions or linkage fees on developers of new hazardous 
waste disposal facilities to compel them to clean up old sites, while 
potentially effective, raises substantial problems with regard to the 
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. 9 Furthermore, state statutes 
requiring mediation and arbitration of siting disputes have failed in 
4 John C. Buckley, Reducing the Environmental Impact of CERCLA, 41 S.C. L. REV. 
766, 767, 807-13 (1990); see also Jeff Harrington, Pollution Can Kill a Sale: Wise Investors 
Checking Under the Real Estate, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 7, 1991, at 1-1, col. 2 (dis-
cussing contaminated industrial and commercial properties in Cincinnati). 
5 The issue of "orphan" liability is becoming more prominent as the EPA begins to focus 
on sites that were used for lengthy periods of time. See William W. Balcke, Note, Superfund 
Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REV. 123, 149-51 (1988). 
This Article addresses orphan liability infra notes 19, 84-127 and accompanying text. 
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988); see also infra notes 20-22, 67-83 and accompanying text. 
For discussions of liability for municipal solid waste (MSW), see generally Steven Ferrey, The 
Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 197 (1988); Rena Steinzor, Local Governments and Superfund: Who Will Pay the 
Tab?, 22 URB. LAW. 79 (1990); Michelle L. Washington, Note, A Proposed Scheme of Munic-
ipal Waste-Generator Liability, 100 YALE L.J. 805 (1990) (describing recent CERCLA liti-
gation involving municipal landfills, and arguing that CERCLA is designed to hold munici-
palities liable). 
7 See infra notes 84-130 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 131-63 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 164-86 and accompanying text. 
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most instances to overcome NIMBY opposition to the development 
of new waste disposal facilities.lO Even economic incentives have 
failed in convincing most communities to accept these facilities, al-
though a few localities have said yes to cash. 11 
Commentators have written extensively about the problems of 
siting new hazardous waste disposal facilities and cleaning up old 
waste sites, but no one has explored the relationship between these 
problems. 12 In particular, some commentators have maintained that 
the federal and state governments should employ various economic 
incentives to encourage the remediation of abandoned hazardous 
waste sites. 13 Other commentators have argued that states should 
preempt local zoning designed to keep out waste disposal facilities, 
or require mediation and binding arbitration of disputes involving 
the siting of these facilities. 14 
This Article will show that neither economic incentives nor me-
diation alone has been successful in addressing the issues of siting 
or remediation, despite good theoretical reasons for the success of 
both approaches. This Article advocates a two-pronged approach of 
using economic incentives and mediation together to attack the di-
lemmas of siting and remediation. A developer could offer to reme-
diate an orphan or MSW landfill site, and thereby improve public 
safety, in exchange for the opportunity to build a new, less risky 
hazardous or solid waste disposal facility.15 In conjunction with me-
10 See Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous 
Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 270-74 (1982) 
(arguing that preemption often does not work because municipalities enact ordinances, and 
neighborhood groups litigate, lobby state officials, and employ civil disobedience, to discourage 
facilities); infra notes 187-251 and accompanying text; see also supra note 3 and accompanying 
text. 
II See, e.g., Jonathan P. Meyers, Note, Confronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal 
Involvement as a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79 GEO. L.J. 567, 
572 (1991); infra notes 187-92, 207-08, 247-51 and accompanying text. 
12 Compare Kathleen M. Martin, Public/Private Cooperation in the Development of Con-
taminated Properties, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. L. Tab C, at 7-10 and 
Richard L. Stroup, Hazardous Waste Policy: A Property Rights Prospective, 20 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 868, 872 (Sept. 22, 1989) (advocating economic incentives to encourage private parties 
to clean up contaminated sites) with MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC 
OPPOSITION (1983) (discussing how to overcome public opposition to siting waste disposal 
facilities) and Delogu, supra note 3 and Tarlock, supra note 3. 
13 See generally Martin, supra note 12, at 7-10; Stroup, supra note 12, at 872-73. 
14 See generally O'HARE, supra note 12 (discussing mediation and arbitration); Delogu, 
supra note 3 (discussing preemption strategies and their limitations); Tarlock, supra note 3, 
at 438-80 (discussing preemption strategies and their limitations). 
16 The possibility of a developer of a hazardous waste disposal facility offering a state or 
municipality the cleanup of an abandoned waste site as compensation for the siting of the 
developer's new facility is one proposal in a long list of possible compensatory measures 
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diation and negotiated compensation, this proposal may be able to 
quell public opposition to new facilities and accelerate the cleanup of 
orphan and MSW landfill sites. 
Section II of this Article reviews CERCLA's history and structure 
and explores "problem" waste sites. The discussion of problem sites 
examines orphan sites and MSW landfill sites and considers the 
position of prospective purchasers of such sites. Section III analyzes 
three incentives for private cleanups: auctions of orphan sites, tax 
incentives, and impact fees. Section IV considers whether mediation 
and arbitration can overcome NIMBY opposition to siting new waste 
disposal facilities. Section V sets forth a proposal for the remediation 
and reuse of contaminated sites. 
II. CERCLA's PROBLEM CHILDREN 
There are thousands of sites in the United States that are contam-
inated with hazardous waste. This estimate includes the more than 
1,000 sites listed on the National Priorities List (NPL)16-sites that 
the EPA has estimated will cost at least $30 billion to clean Up.17 
Many contaminated sites are located on prime industrial and com-
mercial properties. 18 The precise number of orphan sites is unknown, 
because the EPA must perform an extensive investigation to deter-
mine whether any solvent parties exist at a site, and the agency has 
not done so for many NPL sites. 19 In December 1989, the EPA 
presented in a report on hazardous waste siting in North Carolina. MARTIN SMITH ET AL., 
FINAL REPORT: COSTS AND BENEFITS TO LOCAL GoVERNMENT DUE TO PRESENCE OF A 
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITY AND RELATED COMPENSATION ISSUES 75 (1985) 
(report by Institute for Environmental Studies at University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill). The report did not provide any analysis of this proposal or any hint of whether it ever 
has been implemented. One of the authors of the report subsequently reproduced the list of 
compensatory measures in a book, but likewise offered no analysis regarding the connection 
between the siting and the remediation of orphan hazardous waste sites. RICHARD N.L. 
ANDREWS ET AL., HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IN NORTH CAROLINA: A GUIDE FOR DECISION-
MAKERS IN LOCAL GoVERNMENT 113 (1985). 
16 By 1989, the EPA had compiled an inventory of about 27,000 hazardous waste sites and 
placed 1077 of these sites on the National Priorities List (NPL). COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 162-63 (1989). 
17 Year-Long Study Set to Evaluate Alternative Superfund Financing, [1990-1991 Transfer 
Binder] 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2131, 2131 (Mar. 29, 1991). 
18 See Turner T. Smith, Jr., Thoughts on Investing in Contaminated Property-Can Market 
Driven Remediation Help?, 1989 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. L. 1, 1. See generally 
ACQUIRING PROBLEM PROPERTIES: MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK (Real Estate Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 348, 1990) (essays dealing with problems of owning, 
selling, and buying contaminated property). 
19 Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settle-
ments, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,241 (1989). 
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estimated that 320, or about twenty-five percent, of the 1219 pro-
posed and final NPL sites probably involved municipalities or MSW 
landfills. 20 Of the 1219 sites, 236, or about twenty percent, actually 
were classified as municipal landfills. 21 According to one estimate, in 
the future, half of the sites on the NPL will be municipal landfills. 22 
While there are a number of differences between the typical or-
phan site and the typical MSW landfill site, there are two questions 
common to both that are worth exploring. First, to what extent can 
government agencies use economic incentives to encourage private 
parties to perform cleanups of these sites instead of using public 
monies? Second, can governments negotiate with developers of new 
facilities to remediate old MSW landfill or orphan sites? 
A. CERCLA's History and Structure 
In 1980, Congress passed CERCLA23 in response to the discovery 
of Love Canal and other toxic waste dumps across the nation. 24 
Because Congress enacted CERCLA hastily during the final weeks 
of the Carter Administration, there is little legislative history indi-
cating how the statute's proponents intended the EPA to achieve its 
broad cleanup goals.25 CERCLA authorized the president to respond 
to actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances26 and pro-
vided $1.6 billion over five years to establish a "Superfund" for 
financing cleanups.27 It also instructed the EPA to develop a "na-
20 Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,071 
(1989); see also Washington, supra note 6, at 808 n.34. 
21 Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,071 
(1989); see also Washington, supra note 6, at 808 n.35. 
22 Washington, supra note 6, at 808 n.36 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
SUPERFUND STRATEGY 4--5 (1985». 
23 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). 
24 See Balcke, supra note 5, at 123; Roger J. Marzulla & Brett G. Kappel, Lender Liability 
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 41 
S.C. L. REV. 705, 705-06 (1990); Lawrence S. Coven, Comment, Liability Under CERCLA: 
After a Decade of Delegation, the Time Is Ripe for Legislative Reform, 17 OHIO N. U. L. 
REV. 165, 176-82 (1990); G. Alan Perkins, Comment, Lender Liability Under CERCLA 
Deserves More Than a Fleeting Glance, 13 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 209,219-21 (1991). 
See generally H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1 reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119 (legislative history of CERCLA); Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History 
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") 
Act of 1980,8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). 
26 See Grad, supra note 24, at 1. 
26 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988). 
27 See id. § 9631 (1982) (provision establishing Superfund); id. § 9611 (1988) (current 
provision regarding Superfund); see also Balcke, supra note 5, at 123. 
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tional priority list" of the nation's worst hazardous waste sites. 28 
While Congress created the Superfund as a potential source of funds 
for the remediation of hazardous waste sites, the EPA has sought 
to finance the cleanup of the sites as much as possible through the 
contributions of the parties who caused the contamination, the "po-
tentially responsible parties" (PRPS).29 
Under CERCLA, PRPs are liable for contamination that occurred 
long before the enactment of the statute, even if they followed 
commonly accepted, legal disposal methods at the time of disposal. 30 
CERCLA did not set forth an explicit liability standard for PRPs, 
but courts soon established that all the PRPs at a site were jointly 
and severally liable for the entire cost of the cleanup, even if some 
had made a minimal contribution to the contamination and others 
were more responsible. 31 A PRP held liable for the entire cost of a 
cleanup must bring its own contribution action against other PRPs, 
some of whom may be bankrupt, unidentifiable, or dissolved. 32 
In 1986, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA)33 made a number of important changes to CERCLA. The 
amendments established cleanup requirements,34 replenished the Su-
perfund,35 formalized the EPA's settlement policies,36 enhanced state 
and public participation in the site remediation process,37 and made 
federal facilities subject to CERCLA.38 By providing elaborate 
mechanisms for contribution in SARA, Congress in effect ratified 
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1988); see also Balcke, supra note 5, at 123 n.5. 
29 See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982); 
see also Owen T. Smith, The Expansive Scope of Liable Parties Under CERCLA, 63 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 821, 821 (1989); Enforcement Effort Has Been Inefficient, May Cause Cleanup 
Delay, Rand Report Finds, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 826, 826 (Sept. 15, 1989). 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 
810 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Hooker 
Cherns. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 556-57 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Shell 
Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1069-73 (D. Colo. 1985); see also Buckley, supra note 4, at 777-78. 
31 See, e.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 170-72; United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. 
Supp. 1249, 1252-57 (S.D. III. 1984); United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp. 572 F. Supp. 802, 
806-07 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see also Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 24, at 708-09; Coven, supra 
note 24, at 176-94. 
32 See, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1048 (D. Mass. 
1989), afl'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Coven, supra note 24, at 192-93. 
33 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988». 
34 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1988). 
36 Id. § 9611. 
36 Id. § 9622. 
37 See id. § 9605(a)(8)(B). 
38 See id. § 9620; see also Balcke, supra note 5, at 133--'W. 
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court decisions that read a joint and several liability standard into 
CERCLA: an action that suggests congressional intent to establish 
a joint and several liability regime. 39 CERCLA was due for both 
reauthorization and revision in 1991, but in 1990, Congress simply 
reauthorized the existing statutory scheme until 1994.40 
CERCLA imposes liability for hazardous waste cleanups on four 
categories of PRPS.41 First, the current owners and operators42 of a 
"facility"43 from which there is a release or threatened release of any 
substance statutorily identified as hazardous may be jointly and 
severally liable for the release. 44 Second, past owners and operators 
who owned or operated a facility when hazardous substances were 
disposed of there may be still liable under CERCLA.45 Third, haz-
ardous substance generators who arranged for disposal of their sub-
stances at any facility in the United States may be liable for the 
entire cost of cleaning up that particular facility even though their 
39 SARA does not explicitly endorse joint and several liability, but its legislative history 
suggests that Congress approved of judicial use of this standard. See Richard H. Mays, 
Settlements with SARA: A Comprehensive Review of Settlement Procedures Under the Su-
perfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,101, 
10,102 n.12 (Apr. 1987); Perkins, supra note 24, at 223 (citing 126 CONGo REC. S14,964 (daily 
ed. Nov. 24, 1980». 
40 Cleanup Program Extended for Three Years, Tax Authority for Four Years in Budget 
Bill, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1243, 1243 (Nov. 2, 1990). The reauthorization was included at the 
last minute in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which Congress approved on October 
27, 1990. Id. Congress reauthorized the Superfund program without change until September 
30, 1994 and the Superfund itself until December 31, 1995. Id. The new legislation funds the 
program at a total funding level of $5.1 billion from October I, 1991 to September 30, 1994. 
Id. One reason that congressional leaders gave for simply reauthorizing CERCLA until 1994 
was that it would be impossible for Congress to reauthorize both CERCLA and RCRA in the 
same year. Id. 
41 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
42 Id. § 9607(a)(I). The definition of "owner or operator" also includes an owner or operator 
of a "vessel." I d. 
43 Id. § 9601(9). 
44 For a discussion of owner and operator liability, including relevant case law, see Smith, 
supra note 29, at 824-31. 
46 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). There is controversy regarding whether CERCLA 
preempts state corporate dissolution laws, which generally provide for a two-year statute of 
limitation. Compare United States V. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987) 
(CERCLA preempts state corporate dissolution laws) with Levin Metals Corp. V. Parr-
Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (CERCLA does not preempt state 
corporate dissolution laws) and Onan Corp. V. Industrial Steel Corp., 770 F. Supp. 490 (D. 
Minn. 1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 431 (1990) (CERCLA 
does not preempt state corporate dissolution laws). See generally Audrey J. Anderson, Note, 
Corporate Life After Death: CERCLA Preemption of State Corporate Dissolution Law, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 131 (1989) (arguing that CERCLA preempts state corporate dissolution laws, 
but only for corporations dissolved after CERCLA's enactment in 1980). 
--- ----------
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contribution was small.46 Finally, persons who transported hazardous 
substances to a facility also may be liable. 47 
Under CERCLA, PRPs have very limited defenses. A PRP has 
the burden of establishing that the contamination resulted entirely 
from an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third 
party that has no contractual or other relevant relationship with the 
PRP.48 In practice, these three defenses are of no use to most 
PRPS.49 The so-called "innocent landowner" defense is available to 
a current owner who conducted an appropriate environmental in-
quiry that reasonably failed to disclose the presence of hazardous 
substances before the owner's purchase of the contaminated prop-
erty.50 The PRP owner has the burden of establishing the innocent 
landowner defense. 51 
To mitigate some of the harshness in holding a PRP liable for the 
entire cost of a cleanup where the PRP made only a minimal contri-
bution to the contamination at a particular site, SARA authorizes 
and to some extent encourages the EPA to reach settlements with 
de minimis parties in any of the four statutory categories. 52 The 
EPA has considerable discretion, however, in deciding who qualifies 
as a de minimis party and in dictating the terms of settlement. 53 
SARA also authorizes the EPA to enter into "mixed funding" 
settlements, in which funds from both PRPs and the Superfund 
finance remediation at a site. 54 The conference report accompanying 
46 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988); see also Smith, supra note 29, at 831--32. See generally 
Jeffrey H. Howard & Linda E. Benfeild, CERCLA Liability for Hazardous Waste "Genera-
tors"; How Far Does Liability Extend?, 9 TEMPLE ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 33 (1990) . 
• 7 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988); see also United States v. Western Processing Co., 756 F. 
Supp. 1416, 1419-20 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (waste transporter's liability under CERCLA should 
be restricted to situations where haulers select waste sites they use). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988); see also Perkins, supra note 24, at 221-22 (discussing limited 
nature of CERCLA defenses) . 
•• See Buckley, supra note 4, at 771-72; Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 24, at 707-09. 
60 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988); see also Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 24, at 721-23. See 
generally Eric Baumstark, Note, Innocent vs. Ignorant: When Is an Innocent Purchaser 
Innocent Under CERCLA, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1319 (1990). 
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988); see also Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 24, at 721-23; 
Baumstark, supra note 50, at 1321-22. 
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(B) (1988); Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Set-
tlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,235-41 (1989); see also 
Balcke, supra note 5, at 142-45. See generally Joel D. Newton, Note, The Innocent Too Shall 
Pay; EPA's Settlement Policy Under CERCLAfor De Minimis Landowner Liability, 51 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 727 (1990). 
63 See Newton, supra note 52, at 743 (criticizing EPA for coercing persons with good 
innocent landowner defenses into accepting de minimis settlements to avoid costs of litigation). 
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(l) (1988). 
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the 1986 amendments approved the use of the Superfund to provide 
a portion of cleanup costs where bankrupt, unidentifiable, or dis-
solved PRPs had caused a substantial amount of the total contami-
nation at the site and it would be unfair to require the remaining 
PRPs to pay the entire cost of the cleanup;55 the report emphasized, 
however, that the EPA should seek to shift the burdens of mixed 
funding to nonsettlors.56 The mixed funding provision does not ad-
dress situations in which no viable PRPs exist to fund the cleanup 
of an orphan site. 57 
In addition, there is for secured creditors a statutory exemption 
that excludes from the definition of "owner and operator" any person 
who holds a security interest in a contaminated site but never has 
participated in the management of that "facility."58 The interpreta-
tion of what constitutes management participation, however, has 
created enormous controversy. As a result of this controversy, the 
EPA in June 1991 proposed guidelines that may provide adequate 
protection for lenders who seek to foreclose upon contaminated prop-
erty.59 The secured creditor exemption affects many lenders that 
65 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3345; Balcke, supra note 5, at 136-38. 
66 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3345. 
67 A distinction should be made between orphan sites and orphan shares at a site where 
some PRPs are still solvent and may be able to pay part or all of a cleanup. Compare Outboard 
Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 
1985), judgment vacated, 479 U.S. 1002 (1986) ("CERCLA was designed to remedy hazardous 
waste sites, specifically abandoned or 'orphan' dump sites.") (quoting United States V. Wade, 
546 F. Supp. 785, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1982), appeal dismissed, 713 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1983» with 
Balcke, supra note 5, at 149-51 (discussing orphan shares). The EPA applies its mixed funding 
policy only where orphan shares exist. Balcke, supra note 5, at 136-38. 
68 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). The statute excludes from CERCLA liability coverage 
any "person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia 
of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." [d. Numerous 
articles have addressed the issue oflender liability under CERCLA. See, e.g., Perkins, supra 
note 24, at 226-47; see also infra note 59 and accompanying text. See generally Ann M. 
Burkhart, Lender/Owners and CERCLA: Title and Liability, 25 HARV. J. LEGIS. 317 (1988); 
Michele B. Corash & Lawrence Behrendt, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Search for a 
Safe Harbor, 43 Sw. L.J. 863 (1990); Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 24. 
69 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability 
Under CERCLA, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed 
June 5, 1991). In United States V. Fleet Factors, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit constructed the term "management participation" to hold liable under CER-
CLA any secured creditor that "could affect hazardous waste decisions if it so chose." 901 
F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). Fleet Factors created 
enormous concern in the lending community, whose intense lobbying subsequently led over 
half the members of the United States House of Representatives to support legislation creating 
greater protection for lenders. See Perkins, supra note 24, at 239; Creditors Who Follow 
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have foreclosed upon or may have to foreclose upon contaminated 
properties and therefore favor a liberal policy toward exempting the 
prospective purchasers of such properties from CERCLA liability. 60 
The federal government itself has an interest in the EPA's policy 
toward these purchasers, because the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) have 
acquired many banks that own contaminated property.61 The EPA 
has proposed regulations that would exempt the FDIC and RTC 
from liability, but has failed to provide special protection for parties 
that subsequently buy property from these government entities. 62 
Sound Practices Would be Exempt From Liability, Draft Says, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1891, 
1891-92 (Feb. 22, 1991) (recounting furor over Fleet Factors decision and resulting proposed 
legislation in Congress) [hereinafter Creditors). 
In January 1991, the EPA sent to the federal Office of Management and Budget a revised 
draft rule that contained greater protections for lenders. Proposed Draft Rule on Lender 
Liability Under CERCLA with Accompanying Letter from EPA to OMB-Jan. 24, 1991,21 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1908 (Feb. 22, 1991); see also Carey S. Rosemarin, Lenders Still Face 
Cleanup Issues Under Revised Liability Rules, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25,1991, at 24-26; Creditors, 
supra, at 1891-92. On June 5, 1991, the EPA issued the proposed rule to protect banks, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) 
from liability. EPA Proposes Lender Liability Rule, Easing Fears of Financial Institutions, 
22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 299,299-300 (June 7, 1991). Commentators have debated whether this 
proposed rule is too favorable or too restrictive. Compare Amy T. Phillips, EPA's Lender 
Liability Rule: A Sweetheart Deal For Bankers?, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1158 (Aug. 23, 1991) 
(arguing that proposed rule too lenient) with Philip R. Sellinger & Avery S. Chapman, EPA's 
Proposed Rule on Lender Liability Under CERCLA: No Panaceafor the Financial Services 
Industry, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,618 (Oct. 1991) (criticizing rule as too 
restrictive). 
60 A recent study of the financial statements of major banks raises questions about whether 
lenders are bearing as large a burden as they claim for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. 
Amy D. Marcus & Amy Stevens, Banks' Burden in Cleanups is Questioned, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 11, 1991, at B5. John Byrne, senior counsel to the American Bankers Association, 
commented that the study did not reflect potential liability problems. Id. Many lenders will 
not lend money to both high-risk industries and small businesses that use real estate as 
collateral because of the uncertainties about the secured creditor exemption. Id. 
61 See FDIC, Resolution Trust Corp. Seek Protection in Senate Bill Limiting Exposure 
Under CERCLA, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 533, 534 (July 27, 1990). Steven Seelig, the director 
of the FDIC's Division of Liquidation, estimated that the FDIC owned 270 contaminated 
assets with a total book value of $365 million, and that the cost of cleaning up these properties 
could exceed $1 billion. Id. The RTC is so concerned that CERCLA liability may discourage 
private sector entities from managing RTC properties that it has added indemnity provisions 
to its contracts; the provisions give extra protection to private sector managers, although the 
managers still would be liable if they were grossly negligent. See RTC Adds CERCLA 
Indemnity Provisions to Standard Asset Management Agreement, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1806, 
1806 (Feb. 8, 1991). 
62 The FDIC and RTC support legislation to give additional protection to lenders. See 
Perkins, supra note 24, at 212. The lender liability rule that the EPA proposed on June 5, 
1991, however, does not address providing protections to prospective purchasers who buy 
property from the FDIC, RTC, or other security holders. See Phillips, supra note 59, at 1159, 
1162. 
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B. Problem Sites 
1. Orphan Sites 
The problem of "orphan" liability is looming large as the EPA 
begins to focus its enforcement efforts on sites that were used as 
waste disposal facilities for extended periods of time. 63 The primary 
cause of this serious problem is the number of hazardous waste 
facilities that have declared or are likely to declare bankruptcy. 
Approximately seventy-four waste facilities had filed for bankruptcy 
as of August 1985, and many more were expected to follow. 64 The 
EPA currently estimates that between twenty-five and thirty per-
cent of the companies owning land disposal facilities will petition for 
bankruptcy over the next fifty years. 65 Bankrupt companies often 
lack sufficient insurance or financial assets to pay for the typical 
multimillion-dollar Superfund cleanup. 66 
2. MSW Landfill Sites 
Municipalities can be potentially liable under CERCLA.67 The 
EPA, however, has treated municipalities differently from private 
parties. In fact, in December 1989, the agency issued a policy state-
ment aimed specifically at municipalities, the "Interim Policy on 
CERCLA Settlements Involving Municipalities or Municipal 
Wastes. "68 The Policy exempts municipal waste generators that dis-
pose of their wastes at privately owned mixed-use disposal sites-
sites that accept both MSW and hazardous waste-from liability 
under CERCLA when the municipality's waste "is believed to come 
from households, regardless of whether household hazardous waste 
63 See Balcke, supra note 5, at 149--51. 
64 Joseph L. Cosetti & Jeffrey M. Friedman, Midlantic National Bank, Kovacs and Penn 
Terra: The Bankruptcy Code and State Environmental Law-Perceived Conflicts and Options 
for the Trustee and State Environmental Agencies, 7 J.L. & COM. 65, 68 (1987); Comment, 
A Congressional Choice: The Question of Environmental Priority in Bankrupt Estates, 9 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 73, 77-78 (1990). 
66 Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 64, at 68; Comment, supra note 64, at 78. 
66 See Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 64, at 68; Comment, supra note 64, at 78. See 
generally Steven W. Black, Comment, The Fact and Fiction of Financial Responsibility for 
Hazardous Waste Management, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 581 (1990). 
67 See Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 
51,074 (1989); Washington, supra note 6, at 811-12. A state or local government is not liable 
if it merely acquires a site through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, or abandonment and has not 
caused a release or threatened release on the property. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988). 
66 See Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 
51,073 (1989). I 
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may be present. "69 In other words, the EPA is not going to sue a 
municipality because a citizen throws a can of roach or rodent killer 
into the garbage. 
As a matter of policy, the EPA will name a municipal generator 
as a PRP only if there is site-specific evidence that the MSW from 
the municipality contains hazardous substances from a commercial, 
institutional, or industrial process or activity; or if there is an insig-
nificant total volume of commercial, institutional, and industrial 
waste from private contributors relative to the volume of household-
derived waste that the municipality contributed. 70 The agency's vol-
untary policy of limiting its own CERCLA actions against munici-
palities except in specific circumstances does not change the fact that 
the statute treats municipalities the same as any PRP. A private 
party PRP can bring a contribution action against a municipality 
under CERCLA regardless of whether the municipality is a gener-
ator or a MSW landfill owner/operator. 71 In addition, in contrast to 
municipal generators, MSW landfill owner/operators are still "poten-
tially liable just like private parties. "72 
There has been considerable controversy about the extent to which 
municipalities should be liable for the cleanup of household hazardous 
waste that they collect from their residents. Home pesticides, clean-
ing agents, and other commonly used household toxics comprise 
between 0.1 % and 0.4% of the MSW waste stream. 73 Some industrial 
PRPs have argued in favor of the so-called "Delta Theory," which 
proposes assessing liability on a volumetric basis. 74 These PRPs 
maintain that, because industrial waste at mixed-use sites inevitably 
contaminates ordinary household waste, they should not be respon-
sible for household waste that has been commingled with industrial 
69 Id. at 51,072 (emphasis added); see also Washington, supra note 6, at 812. 
70 Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,072 
(1989); see also Washington, supm note 6, at 812. 
71 See Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 
51,073-75 (1989); see also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 974 (D. Conn. 1991) 
(denying motion for summary judgment by several municipal generators because they were 
potentially liable under CERCLA). 
72 Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,072 
(1989); see also Washington, supm note 6, at 812-13. 
73 Compare B.F. Goodrich, 754 F. Supp. at 972 (expert testimony estimated that 0.3% to 
0.4% of MSW is hazardous substances) with Ferrey; supra note 6, at 210 (hazardous waste 
may constitute less than 0.1% of waste stream). 
74 See Norman W. Bernstein, To Clean Up Landfills, the Leader Should Be Municipalities 
Using Economic Incentives to Settle, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,012, 10,013 (Jan. 
1989). 
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waste, and municipalities should bear a larger portion of cleanup 
expenses. 75 
A growing number of landfills, especially in the eastern United 
States, are scheduled to close within the next few years, and there 
is widespread agreement that United States citizens must reduce 
the amount of waste they produce. 76 Municipalities are only begin-
ning to address this problem. 77 Currently, the United States landfills 
seventy-six percent of its waste, incinerates thirteen percent, and 
recycles only eleven percent. 78 In 1988, the EPA set a national goal 
of twenty-five percent source reduction and recycling by 1992,79 but 
there has been disagreement about the extent to which recycling, 
composting, and other source reduction methods can achieve or sur-
pass this goal. 80 Some commentators have argued that households 
must bear the cost of disposing of wastes in order to encourage 
individuals to conserve resources, and have proposed volume or 
toxicity taxes on household garbage. 81 
Even if source reduction methods reduce the future flow of MSW, 
however, many municipalities still may bear significant liability for 
old MSW dumps.82 The threat of CERCLA liability may increase 
dramatically the cost of operating MSW landfills, which likely still 
75 See Steinzor, supra note 6, at 123-26 (criticizing "Delta Theory"). 
76 See Washington, supra note 6, at 808; see also infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
77 See Washington, supra note 6, at 808; see also infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
78 See Peter s. Menell, Beyond the Throwaway Society: An Incentive Approach to Regu-
lating Municipal Solid Waste, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655,664 (1990). 
79 Id. at 658. 
80 See, e.g., INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, BEYOND 40 PERCENT: RECORD-
SETTING RECYCLING AND COMPOSTING PROGRAMS 57 (1990) (arguing that recycling and 
composting can exceed EPA's 25% goal); THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: OPPOSING VIEW-
POINTS 107-86 (John S. Bach & Lynn Hall eds., 1986). 
81 See, e.g., Menell, supra note 78, at 687-95 (comparing curbside charges with other 
solutions). One commentator advocates volume- and toxicity-based taxes. Washington, supra 
note 6, at 823. According to this commentator, a municipality easily could measure volume by 
the number of cans or bins designated for collection. Id. A toxicity tax might involve higher 
transaction costs and raise privacy concerns because it would require inspections of individuals' 
garbage cans. Id. at 823 n.133. Government searches of wastes set out for collection would 
not violate the Fourth Amendment, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988), but could 
violate state constitutional provisions in two states. See State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1277 
(Haw. 1985) (Hawaii Constitution requires warrant for garbage searches); State v. Hempele, 
576 A.2d 793, 814 (N.J. 1990) (New Jersey Constitution requires warrant for garbage left on 
curb). Hempele's holding suggests that an administrative search warrant, as discussed in 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), might be sufficient for these searches. 
Hempele, 576 A.2d at 813; Washington, supra note 6, at 823 n.133. 
82 See Steinzor, supra note 6, at 102-31 (municipalities face potentially large CERCLA 
liabilities). 
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will be necessary even if current source reduction efforts are suc-
cessful. 83 
C. Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Sites 
In 1989, in response to numerous requests from private parties 
interested in purchasing contaminated property, the EPA issued a 
Policy Statement regarding the status of prospective purchasers of 
contaminated property under CERCLA.84 The Policy Statement 
made it clear that the EPA would not consider providing protection 
from CERCLA liability to private parties that were engaged in real 
estate transactions involving contaminated property unless the 
agency thereby could avoid the expenditure of Superfund monies to 
clean up the property in question. 85 The EPA recognized that it 
would benefit if it could shift the cost of cleaning up an orphan site 
to a private party that would be interested in developing the con-
taminated property after restoring it for reuse. 86 The agency there-
fore announced in the Policy Statement that a prospective purchaser 
could participate in such a cleanup either by performing a substantial 
response action itself or by paying the EPA a substantial sum toward 
the cleanup. 87 
The EPA voiced certain reservations in the Policy Statement 
about providing protection from CERCLA liability to prospective 
purchasers of contaminated property. Among the reasons for the 
agency's cautiousness was its concern that other factors might out-
weigh any benefit that the government would receive in avoiding 
the expenditure of monies from the Superfund. Because the EPA 
has not conducted a remedial investigation/feasibility study (RIIFS) 
or a PRP search at most NPL sites, it lacks important information 
about the parties that may be responsible for the contamination at 
a site, the extent of the contamination, and the appropriate remedy. 88 
Thus, the Policy Statement warned that, in many cases, the EPA 
would not know whether a prospective purchaser safely could de-
&'I See Washington, supra note 6, at 817-24 (arguing that municipalities should bear cost of 
remediating MSW landfills even though taxpayers may have to pay significant amounts and 
CERCLA liability may discourage municipalities from collecting garbage). 
84 Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settle-
ments, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,241-43 (1989). 
85 Id. at 34,241-42. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 34,241. 
88 Id. at 34,242-43. 
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velop a property without interfering with the agency's cleanup 
plan. 89 
While the Policy Statement raised legitimate concerns, there are 
solutions to some of the potential problems it foresaw. For example, 
if the EPA lacks information about a particular site, a prospective 
purchaser could perform the RifFS instead of waiting for the EPA 
to dQ it. There is evidence that private parties perform RIfFSs and 
other remedial work more quickly and cheaply than the agency90-
a significant fact given that the average RifFS currently takes 
twenty-five months, and the entire cleanup process can last as long 
as five years. 91 SARA allows partial settlements under which a PRP 
may conduct a RifFS without any agreement beforehand regarding 
which parties shall perform the remainder of the cleanup.92 Prospec-
tive purchasers should have the same opportunity as PRPs to per-
form RIfFSs if they desire to do so. 
The Policy Statement also noted that the EPA may not know 
whether any financially solvent PRPs exist at a site, and therefore 
may not know whether the site is an orphan requiring the govern-
ment to spend Superfund monies. 93 In preparing a RifFS, a pro-
spective purchaser could assist the agency in determining whether 
PRPs exist that are financially capable of paying for a significant 
portion of the cleanup at the particular site that the purchaser wants 
89 Id. at 34,241. 
90 BaJcke, supra note 5, at 134--35. A 1990 study found that "costs at sites where the federal 
government paid for the work jumped an average of 75 percent from the time planners decided 
how a site should be cleaned up to the actual completion of the work. In sharp contrast, costs 
for private sector cleanups increased an average of 15 percent." Cost of Waste Cleanups 
Underestimated, Especially if Federally Funded, Study Finds, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1485, 
1485 (Nov. 30, 1990). The author of the study, Brett R. Schroeder of Independent Project 
Analysis in Reston, Virginia, concluded that private industry is more efficient because of its 
motive of profit maximization. Id. at 1486. 
It is interesting to note that several business groups have sued the EPA over its decision 
to prohibit private firms from conducting RIIFSs. Wade Lambert & Ellen J. Pollock, Former 
Ashland Oil Chairman Gets 2 Years' Probation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3,1990, at B8. The groups 
contend that government RIIFSs would be more expensive, and cite a recent Senate Budget 
Committee report showing that government contractors at Superfund sites spend from two 
to five times as much as private companies for the same work. Id. On the other hand, the 
EPA contends that privately conducted RIIFSs are frequently biased. Id. 
91 See Balcke, supra note 5, at 128. 
92 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988); Balcke, supra note 5, at 138-40. The EPA, however, has 
proposed to bar PRPs from performing risk assessments at Superfund sites in order to prevent 
the possibility of biased assessments. Public Comment, Risk Assessment Policy Review Key 
to Settlement Between EPA and Industry Groups, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1931, 1931 (Dec. 6, 
1991). 
93 Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settle-
ments, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,241 (1989). 
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to buy. For example, the prospective purchaser could hire an envi-
ronmental consulting firm to identify and locate PRPs rather than 
relying on the EPA to perform these investigative tasks. 
The EPA was deeply concerned about the safety risks inherent in 
allowing a prospective purchaser to develop or utilize contaminated 
land. 94 It implied in the Policy Statement that there is always a 
possibility that the development or use of a former waste disposal 
site may result in a release of hazardous substances.95 In 1989, 
however, the agency published a study showing that the environ-
mental and human health risks from CERCLA sites are relatively 
low; according to the study, statutory mandates and public opinion 
have forced the government to treat these sites as a high priority 
compared to the more substantial dangers that radon, indoor pollu-
tion, and pesticide residues pose. 96 
It is noteworthy that the EPA in four cases has allowed a pro-
spective purchaser to develop a contaminated orphan site based on 
an agency determination that the safety risks were acceptable. 97 
Furthermore, there actually may be a benefit in terms of safety if a 
prospective purchaser can perform a RIIFS and cleanup faster than 
the EPA. The greatest problem with the Superfund program has 
been the slow pace at which the EPA has conducted cleanups, even 
at sites on the NPL.98 Of course, the EPA should review carefully 
94 Id. 
96 See id. According to the Policy Statement, 
Id. 
. . . the listing of any site on the NPL means that there is a release or threatened 
release of hazardous substances from the site. Development and commercial use of 
such sites may pose a danger to those persons present at such sites, and the activities 
to be carried out by the purchaser, even with the exercise of due care, may aggravate 
or contribute to the contamination. 
96 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, COMPARING RISKS AND SETTING 
ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES: OVERVIEW OF THREE REGIONAL PROJECTS 62-65 (1989); see 
also John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, 
and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 291 (1991) (reviewing EPA study); 
Lester B. Lave, Risk Assessment and Regulatory Priorities, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 307, 
309-11 (1989) (reaching same conclusion as EPA study). 
fYI See infra notes 109-27 and accompanying text. 
98 See Cleanup Funds Wasted on 'Transaction Costs,' CERCLA Needs Complete Overhaul, 
ABA Panel Says, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 759, 759 (Aug. 10, 1990). J. Kent Holland, an attorney 
from Virginia, told the audience at the American Bar Association's 1990 meeting that the 
Superfund program was a failure because only 27 sites out of 1800 on the NPL had been 
cleaned up. Id. EPA Administrator William K. Reilly has acknowledged that the program 
must move at a faster pace, but EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement James Strock 
defended the low number of cleanups on the grounds that SARA requires a five-year review 
period for site remedies before the EPA can remove a site from the NPL. Id. Strock stated 
that 400 Superfund sites are in the midst of long-term cleanups and an additional 200 sites 
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any plans for developing a contaminated site, to ensure adequate 
safety. The agency also should impose stringent financial responsi-
bility requirements to guarantee that a prospective purchaser can 
pay for remediation if an accidental release of hazardous substances 
occurs. 99 
The Policy Statement regarding prospective purchasers of contam-
inated property establishes an elaborate approval process that may 
deter most of these potential purchasers. 100 Any purchase agreement 
must satisfy the regional administrator in the particular EPA region 
where the site is located, the agency's Assistant Administrators for 
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring and for Solid Waste and 
Emergency Response in Washington, D.C., and the United States 
Attorney General. 101 Perhaps a more serious obstacle for prospective 
purchasers is the Policy Statement's failure to define clearly the 
conditions with which a prospective purchaser must comply to obtain 
approval. A modified approval process could protect the public while 
producing more timely decisions. For example, a regional adminis-
trator could have the conditional authority to grant a covenant not 
are undergoing short-term removal actions. Id. He added that, in 1989, there were 218 
CERCLA settlements with an estimated value of more than $1 billion. Id. The EPA's inspector 
general, however, has charged that the agency misled Congress in 1989 by claiming that it 
had started 178 cleanups when it truly had begun work at only 150 sites; SARA required the 
EPA to initiate 175 cleanups by October 17, 1989. EPA Overstated 1989 Site Cleanup Count, 
Misled Congress, Inspector General Finds, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 220, 220-21 (May 24, 1991). 
On October 3, 1991, United States Senator Frank Lautenberg harshly criticized the EPA's 
implementation of the Superfund program and charged that it still took the agency about 10 
years to clean up a contaminated site, despite the agency's promise in 1989 that it would 
speed up cleanups. Frank Lautenberg, Dingell Blast Superfund Studies; Reilly Focuses on 
Accomplishments of Program, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1531, 1531 (Oct. 11, 1991). Reilly again 
defended the EPA's handling of the Superfund program, but pledged to accelerate cleanups. 
Id. 
99 CERCLA already imposes financial responsibility requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(a)-(b) 
(1988). For a thorough discussion and criticism of the financial responsibility requirements 
that RCRA imposes on hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities, see Black, 
supra note 66, at 581-620. Congress probably should increase the financial responsibility 
requirements for all entities involved with hazardous waste, not just for prospective purchas-
ers. On July 1, 1991, however, the EPA proposed to amend its RCRA financial assurance 
requirements to give large, financially sound institutions more flexibility in meeting the 
agency's financial test criteria. 56 Fed. Reg. 30,201 (1991); see also Financial Test Criteria 
for Facilities Would Be Amended Under EPA Proposed Rule, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 555, 555 
(July 5, 1991). Whether this proposed rule is good policy is beyond the scope of this Article. 
100 Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Set-
tlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,243 (1989); see also Corash & Behrendt, supra note 58, at 
883 (criticizing approval process on ground that time required is impractical for most real 
estate transactions). 
101 Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Set-
tlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,243 (1989). 
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to sue to a prospective purchaser with the proviso that such an 
agreement must be published in the Federal Register, must be 
subject to public comment, and may be vetoed within a limited period 
by either a higher-ranking EPA official or by the United States 
Department of Justice. 
The Policy Statement also may discourage many prospective pur-
chasers because it does not permit a prospective purchaser to assign 
a covenant not to sue to a subsequent purchaser and therefore, as a 
practical matter, restricts the alienability of the property.102 Re-
cently, however, the EPA for the first time signed an agreement 
with a prospective purchaser to limit the potential cleanup liability 
of a foreclosing bank and any subsequent purchasers. 103 In May 1991, 
the agency signed an agreement with Seafirst Bank, which was about 
to foreclose on property linked to a Superfund site in Tacoma, Wash-
ington. 104 In the agreement, the EPA released the bank from future 
CERCLA liability for contamination that other parties had caused, 
in exchange for the bank's promise to clean up the foreclosed prop-
erty and contribute $350,000 to clean up the Superfund site. 105 The 
agreement protects all parties in the chain of title from the bank 
provided that there is proper notice to the EPA. 106 Its restrictions 
and obligations "run with the land" and are binding on anyone ac-
quiring an interest in the property.107 The agreement does not pro-
vide a release from liability, however, for natural resource damages 
or for any releases the bank causes. 108 
The EPA has provided a covenant not to sue to a prospective 
purchaser of contaminated property on three other occasions, twice 
to purchasers of bankrupt chemical companies. In both of these 
cases, the purchaser agreed to remediate extensive contamination 
that otherwise would have required multimillion-dollar expenditures 
from the Superfund. 
102 The Policy Statement, in its "Reservation of Rights" section, states that "[tjhe Agree-
ment should expressly reserve the Agency's rights to assert all claims against the prospective 
purchaser except for those set forth in the covenant not to sue." [d. at 34,242; see also Corash 
& Behrendt, supra note 58, at 884 (discussing negative impact of provision on alienability of 
property and stating that some EPA staff members have suggested to authors that EPA 
would sue subsequent purchasers for pre-prospective purchaser environmental conditions). 
103 EPA Will Not Hold Foreclosing Bank Liable After Bank Agreed to Pay Site Cleanup 
Costs, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 126, 126 (May 17, 1991) (reporting In re BankAmerica Corp., 
U.S. EPA Region 10, No. 1090-11-16-101 (May 10, 1991». 
104 [d. 
105 [d. 
106 [d. 
107 [d. 
lOB [d. 
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In 1987, before the EPA issued the Policy Statement on prospec-
tive purchasers, the agency and the state of Michigan entered into 
a covenant with Phthalchem, Inc. in which the company was allowed 
to operate a chemical plant in exchange for paying a bankruptcy 
trustee $15 million toward remediation of the plant site. 109 Bofors 
Nobel, Inc. (BNI) formerly had operated the chemical company.u° 
In September 1981, BNI and Michigan had entered into a consent 
decree in which BNI agreed to remediate contamination on and off 
the site at an estimated cost of between $12 million and $15 million. III 
BNI established Environmental Systems Corporation of Michigan 
(ESCM) to own and operate a biological carbon treatment system to 
remediate the site. 112 In 1985, BNI and ESCM filed for protection 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; their decision to file for 
bankruptcy was in part the result of their environmental liabilities. 113 
During the reorganization proceedings, BNI and ESCM entered into 
an agreement to sell a substantial portion of their assets to Phthal-
chern; however, the agreement conditioned the sale upon BNI and 
ESCM obtaining a covenant not to sue for Phthalchem from the EPA 
and Michigan. 114 The agreement between BNI and Phthalchem struc-
tured the sale so that BNI would retain title to the most heavily 
contaminated portion of the real property, which contained sludge 
lagoons and landfill areas, and transfer to Phthalchem title to that 
portion of the property upon which the actual manufacturing oper-
ations took place. 115 
The EPA and Michigan agreed to approve the complicated ar-
rangements in the agreement and granted a covenant not to sue to 
Phthalchem because, with the cash generated from the sale, BNI 
and ESCM were able to pay $15 million for cleanup activities as part 
of the distribution of estate assets. 116 Under the terms of the cove-
nant, the EPA and Michigan had the right to enter the Phthalchem 
property at any time to conduct cleanup actions, and there was no 
109 See 1. Leo Motiuk & Daniel J. Sheridan, Incentives and Protections Available to 
Prospective Owners and Operators of Contaminated Property, 1990 A. B. A. SEC. REAL PROP. , 
PROB. & TR. L. Tab B, at 9-13 (discussing Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue by and 
Between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the State of Michigan, Bofors Nobel, 
Inc., Environmental Systems Corporation of Michigan, and Lomac, Inc. dated Mar. 25, 1987). 
110 I d. at 10. 
111 Id; 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 10-11. 
115 Id. at 11. 
116 Id. 
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protection for the company if any cleanup work interrupted its busi-
ness operations. 117 
In a third instance of the EPA providing a covenant not to sue to 
a prospective purchaser of contaminated property, the agency in 
1990 signed a covenant that approved the purchase by a Swedish 
firm, Boliden AG, of the bankrupt Tennessee Chemical Company 
(TCC).118 In the covenant, the EPA released Boliden from liability 
for any contamination that occurred at the TCC site in Copperhill, 
Tennessee, before Boliden began operating the chemical plant there 
in March 1990. 119 In return, Boliden paid the agency $180,000 for 
past response costs and agreed to spend over $8 million on environ-
mental improvements that included reforesting the site, upgrading 
the plant's wastewater treatment system, and cleaning up contami-
nated soil. 120 In September 1990, a federal bankruptcy court ap-
proved the agreement between Boliden and the EPA. 121 
Another covenant involved the unusual circumstances surrounding 
the construction of a federally funded ski project within the bound-
aries of a Superfund site in Idaho. 122 The city of Kellogg, Idaho, had 
obtained a $6.4-million appropriation from the federal government 
to finance the construction of forty-five per cent of a gondola trans-
portation system connected with the Silverhorn ski area, which the 
city owned and operated. 123 The site of the proposed gondola system 
was within the boundaries of the Bunker Hill Superfund site, an 
area covering several square miles and involving several responsible 
parties. 124 The city and other participants entered into a covenant 
with the EPA that allowed the completion of the gondola system in 
117 I d. at 12-13. 
118 Tennessee Chemical Company Site Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue, 55 Fed. Reg. 
52,887, 52,887 (1990). Earlier, the EPA had taken the interesting step of granting a limited 
covenant not to sue to enable the Swedish firm to operate the chemical plant for four to six 
months so that the company could evaluate the plant before making a purchase. See Swedish 
Firm Released From Responsibility for Past Problems at Tennessee CERCLA Site, 20 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1944, 1944 (Apr. 6, 1990). 
119 Tennessee Chemical Company Site Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue, 55 Fed. Reg. 
52,887, 52,887 (1990). 
120 Id. 
121 EPA, Swedish Firm Reach Agreement on Sale of Bankrupt Firm in Tennessee, 21 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1128, 1128 (Oct. 5, 1990) (discussing In re Tennessee Chern. Co., No. 89-
01106 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 1990)). 
122 See Corash & Behrendt, supra note 58, at 883 n.151 (discussing Agreement and Covenant 
Not to Sue Re: Kellogg Gondola Project Located Within the Bunker Hill Superfund Site, U.S. 
E.P.A. Region 10, No. 1089-07-01-122); Motiuk & Sheridan, supra note 109, at 14-15. 
123 See Corash & Behrendt, supra note 58, at 883 n.15!' 
124 Id. 
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exchange for the grading and encapsulating of contaminated soil at 
the site. 125 The EPA did not comply with the strict procedures set 
forth in its Policy Statement regarding prospective purchasers in 
approving this covenant, because at the time the parties signed the 
covenant, the RIIFS for the Bunker Hill Superfund site was only 
partially complete. This agreement reveals that the agency is willing 
to be flexible in the application of its own rules in order to expedite 
the completion of a federally favored project. 126 
Such individual agreements to protect subsequent purchasers are 
helpful. It would be more useful, however, for the EPA to establish 
as a matter of policy that a subsequent purchaser who meets the 
same safety and financial responsibility standards as the original 
prospective purchaser may obtain a covenant not to sue, unless the 
EPA can demonstrate a substantial reason for not providing one. 127 
III. INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE CLEANUPS 
This Article now examines some proposals for using economic 
incentives to encourage prospective purchasers to remediate orphan 
sites, and suggests alternative approaches. It first is necessary to 
ask why it is desirable to encourage private cleanups of orphan sites 
rather than simply have the EPA conduct the cleanup of each site 
and sell the remediated property. 
A brief discussion of the EPA's strengths and weaknesses provides 
a foundation for understanding the advantages of using economic 
incentives to supplement the agency's functions. In general, the EPA 
is a regulatory agency, not a public works agency, and does not have 
the proper staffing to perform cleanups. The agency has recognized 
that its inadequate staffing constrains its ability even to oversee 
cleanups.l28 Furthermore, there is evidence that the EPA is less 
126 See id. 
126 See Motiuk & Sheridan, supra note 109, at 15. 
127 The Policy Statement does not constitute rulemaking by the EPA, and accordingly the 
agency can treat a subsequent purchaser differently from the original prospective purchaser. 
See Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settle-
ments, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,243 (1989). The EPA should promulgate the Policy Statement 
as a formal rule, so prospective purchasers can have confidence that they will be able to sell 
a site to a responsible buyer. 
I2l' See Balcke, supra note 5, at 135 n.68; Longest Says Staff Shortages, Inexperience 
Common in EPA's Superfund Cleanup Program, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 845, 845-46 (July 24, 
1987). The United States Army Corps of Engineers manages many cleanups on the EPA's 
behalf. Benjamin H. Grumbles & Kenneth J. Kopocis, Water Resources Acts: Developing an 
Environmental Corps, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,308, 10,313 (June 1991). 
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efficient than the private sector.129 The agency suffers from high 
staff turnover, poor communication among its personnel, and the 
detrimental effects of intragovernmental rivalries. 130 While it would 
be possible to solve some of the EPA's problems, one can make a 
strong case for allowing the private sector, whenever possible, to 
perform cleanups at orphan sites. Moreover, many of the arguments 
about orphan sites apply equally well to municipalities that may be 
liable for remediating an MSW landfill site. If the EPA is in a poor 
position to conduct cleanups, one can imagine that many municipal-
ities are similarly ill-equipped to perform remedial actions. 
A. Auctioning Orphan Sites 
Richard Stroup, an economics professor at Montana State Uni-
versity, has suggested that the federal government use Superfund 
monies to pay a prospective purchaser to accept ownership of an 
orphan waste site that has a negative value. 131 To accomplish this 
end, he has proposed an innovative bidding system that involves 
auctioning orphan waste sites to those private parties that can un-
dertake a cleanup at a lower cost than the federal government. While 
Stroup does not address the issue of MSW landfill liability, his 
scheme could be adapted to allow municipalities to auction their old 
landfills to EPA-approved private firms; the EPA probably would 
want to hold the municipality ultimately responsible for any CER-
CLA liability. Stroup's basic plan, however, has some serious flaws. 
According to Stroup, the potential purchaser making the lowest 
cleanup cost bid, presumably after meeting minimum financial re-
sponsibility and safety requirements, would receive its bid amount 
129 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
130 See Joel A. Mintz, Economic Reform of Environmental Protection: A Brief Comment 
on a Recent Debate, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 158-59 (1991). 
131 See Stroup, supra note 12, at 872. There are similarities between Stroup's auction 
proposal and the idea of auctioning marketable permits to emit pollution. See generally Bruce 
A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case 
for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 179-84 (1988). The 1990 Amendments 
to the Clean Air Act have adopted a system of marketable permits to reduce emission of 
sulfur dioxide, a major cause of acid rain. Clean Air Act §§ 401-416 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 7651-76510) (West Supp. 1991). Other commentators have discussed the use of market 
incentives to either clean up existing hazardous waste sites or reduce waste generation, but 
this Article focuses on Stroup's proposal because it is both simple and directly concerned with 
the issue of whether the private sector can clean up orphan sites at less cost than the EPA 
or the agency's contractors. See generally Robert W. Hahn, An Evaluation of Options for 
Reducing Hazardous Waste, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 201 (1988); Clifford S. Russell, 
Economic Incentives in the Management of Hazardous Wastes, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 257 
(1988). 
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from the EPA when the agency transfers title to the orphan site to 
the bidder. 132 The new owner would be free to act as it wished, but 
would be liable for any damages or threat of imminent danger that 
it caused. Stroup fails to consider that it may be difficult to distin-
guish between present releases caused solely by past contamination 
and present releases of past contamination caused by the purchaser's 
activities or present releases of new hazardous waste that the pur-
chaser brings to the site. The EPA would require the new owner to 
post a bond as a guarantee that it would avoid such damage. The 
bond, which would remain in the EPA's possession, would be large 
enough to match the costs of responding to any danger that the 
agency had determined the site could pose. The bond's income, over 
and above the monies needed to ensure that it kept pace with infla-
tion, would go to the new owner. The EPA would hold the bond 
either until the completion of a successful cleanup or indefinitely, if 
the remedy chosen was containment. All in all, according to Stroup, 
his proposal would create incentives for biotechnology and other 
firms to develop least-cost methods for cleaning up abandoned haz-
ardous waste sites. 133 
Highly critical of government cleanup efforts because of their 
inefficient use of time and money, Stroup maintains that his proposed 
bidding system would "supplant the [S]uperfund program. "134 His 
proposal, however, ignores the reality that the EPA would have to 
monitor carefully the safety of any cleanup or containment plan. 
Stroup claims that his proposal eliminates the need for political or 
bureaucratic approval of decisions regarding how much funding is 
necessary to cleanup a contaminated site. 135 The EPA, however, still 
would have to determine whether containment is a sufficient remedy 
at each site, whether contractors should remove contaminated ma-
terials and send them to a secure disposal facility,136 or whether a 
132 Id. Because an orphan site has no solvent or identifiable owners, Stroup apparently 
assumes that the EPA or another government agency has title to the site, and that no former 
owner would contest title to the property. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 The remediation of a hazardous waste site can involve either "in situ," or in-place, 
treatment or disposal, with the installment of a cap or cover and long-term continued moni-
toring and maintenance; or "clean closure," which requires the removal of the wastes and 
waste residues for disposal elsewhere. See Elizabeth U. Natter, How Clean Is Clean? Haz-
ardous Waste/Hazardous Substance Cleanup Standards Under Kentucky Law: An Overview, 
18 N. Ky. L. REV. 295, 296 (1990) (contrasting in situ cleanup with clean closure); see also 
Delogu, supra note 3, at 203 n.17. CERCLA's definitional section distinguishes between 
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remedial plan for permanent treatment of the hazardous wastes is 
necessary. SARA established a preference for remedial actions that 
permanently reduce the volume, toxicity, or mobility of hazardous 
substances. Stroup's proposal therefore is inconsistent with congres-
sional intent to the extent that it allows a purchaser to choose 
containment rather than treatment without a prior determination by 
the EPA that containment is the best approach for the purchaser's 
site. 137 
Furthermore, Stroup's proposal itself would require the EPA, at 
every site, to estimate both the cost of cleanup and the risk posed 
by the contamination as a prerequisite for setting the amount of the 
bond. Stroup does not explain what would happen if the EPA later 
determined that the cost of remediation was far higher than first 
anticipated, or concluded that the initial cleanup plan was inade-
quate. In addition, what happens if the purchaser or the issuer of 
the bond files for bankruptcy? Finally, the prospect of paying firms 
Superfund monies without any government supervision is unaccept-
able in our political system, which requires regulatory agencies such 
as the EPA to justify its decisions to Congress, the White House, 
and ultimately to the American people. 138 
B. Tax Incentives 
Kathleen Martin, a practicing attorney in Minnesota, has proposed 
creating for prospective purchasers of contaminated property a 
cleanup tax credit that would be similar to the low-income housing 
credit provided in section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) 
and the rehabilitation tax credit provided in section 48 of the Code. 139 
permanent remedial actions and short-term removal actions designed to prevent the immediate 
threat of hazardous substance releases. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), (24) (1988). 
137 In SARA, Congress made it clear that permanent remedial solutions are preferred over 
other options. 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1988). In some cases, however, the EPA has recognized that 
it may be too difficult and expensive to achieve permanent treatment. See infra note 256 and 
accompanying text. 
188 This Article does not mean to imply that market incentives are inherently at odds with 
our democratic traditions. Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart have argued that markets 
can be designed in ways that enhance democracy. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 131, at 
171. Unlike Stroup, Ackerman and Stewart recognize that the EPA would playa significant 
role in setting goals for and monitoring any system such as a marketable permit system. See 
id. at 183-88. 
139 Martin, supra note 12, at 7. For a discussion of the low-income housing tax credit under 
I.R.C. § 42, see infra note 143 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the rehabilitation 
tax credit under I.R.C. § 48, see Carolyn E. Cheverine & Charlotte M. Hayes, Note, Reha-
bilitation Tax Credit: Does it Still Provide Incentives?, 10 VA. TAX REV. 167 (1990). 
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Under her scheme, this credit could be based upon the costs that a 
private party incurs in cleaning up a site and claimed in the year of 
expenditure. 140 
A purchaser of a contaminated site would have to fulfill several 
conditions in order to receive a cleanup tax credit, according to 
Martin. The taxpayer-purchaser would have to show that it would 
not have cleaned up the site without the benefit of the tax credit, 
and that as a result of its cleanup efforts, the EPA has granted the 
taxpayer-purchaser a covenant not to sue: evidence that the cleanup 
avoided the use of Superfund monies. 141 In addition, the taxpayer-
purchaser would have to prove that it performed an environmental 
audit; that federal and state environmental authorities approved the 
audit; that the taxpayer-purchaser cleaned up the site according to 
a government-approved remedial plan; and that the amount of the 
claimed credit corresponds to the amount of cleanup costs in-
curred. 142 While Martin did not address MSW liability, there is no 
reason that her plan could not be modified to include private parties 
that purchase an MSW landfill. 
It is worth noting that section 42 is controversial, with critics 
charging that it provides more benefits to the wealthy than low-
income housing.143 Moreover, tax credits are rarer than tax deduc-
tions within the Code, because credits provide a dollar-for-dollar tax 
savings to the taxpayer while deductions reduce the taxpayer's tax 
liability only according to the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. Under 
current law, each deductible dollar generally would provide at most 
a thirty-four percent savings to a corporate taxpayer and a thirty-
one percent tax savings to an individual taxpayer. 144 In the current 
fiscal climate, with huge federal budget deficits, it seems unlikely 
that Congress will enact tax credits for prospective purchasers. 145 
140 See Martin, supra note 12, at 7. 
141 Id. at 7-8. 
142 Id. at 8. 
143 See generally Janet Stearns, Comment, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: A Poor 
Solution to the Housing Crisis, 6 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 203 (1988); Dino Fusco, Note, The 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: An Incentive for Owners of Low-Income Housing Units to 
Delay the Maintenance of Their Units, 43 TAX LAW. 969 (1990). 
144 Section 1 of the Code establishes a 31 % marginal rate for the highest-earning individual 
taxpayers, and § 11 of the Code sets a 34% marginal tax rate for the highest-earning corporate 
taxpayers. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (1988). In some circumstances, the marginal rate on an individual 
or corporate taxpayer may be higher than these stated rates. For example, under § 151(d)(3), 
the Code reduces the benefit of personal exemptions for high-income individuals. Id. 
§ 151(d)(3). 
145 In April 1991, Representative Dan Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, urged Congress to allow a dozen popular tax breaks, including the low-
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In addition, in the context of hazardous waste site remediation, a 
full dollar-for-dollar tax credit may not be efficient, because it would 
provide no incentives for minimizing costs. Moreover, there is the 
problem of fraud-a prospective purchaser may pad its costs in order 
to collect a larger credit. Because of the complexities in determining 
the size of the credit and policing fraud, there probably would be 
high transaction costs associated with administering a tax credit 
program. 
If tax credits are too generous for prospective purchasers, should 
their costs in buying and cleaning up contaminated property be 
deductible? This option raises the question of the extent to which 
CERCLA cleanup costs are deductible under the current Internal 
Revenue Code. Although there are few cases regarding the tax 
implications of CERCLA, the issue is becoming more important as 
the number of penalties and payments under the statute continues 
to groW.146 
To answer this question, it is useful to begin by drawing an analogy 
between deducting expenses for waste site cleanups and deducting 
payments of natural resources damages to the government. CER-
income housing credit, to lapse on December 31, 1991, for a savings of more than $2 billion. 
Jackie Calmes, Rostenkowski Urges Congress to Allow a Dozen Popular Tax Breaks to Lapse, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1991, at A2, col. 2. Rostenkowski, citing the "pay-as-you-go" agreement 
in the 1990 budget agreement, stated that committee members will have to come up with 
offsetting tax increases or spending cuts to pay for each expiring tax break. Id. On October 
9, 1991, he appeared more willing to compromise on the possibility of extending these tax 
credits and stated, "I'm for the extensions if somebody will show me how to pay for them." 
The $1.7 Billion Question: What About Expiring Provisions?, 53 TAX NOTES 134, 134 (Oct. 
14, 1991). Several lobbyists have speculated about how Congress might keep these tax credits, 
but the fate of these credits remains uncertain. Id. 
146 See Thomas H. Steele, Tax Consequences Associated with the Ownership and Clean-
Up of Environmentally Damaged Properties, 1989 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. 
L. 1 ("Very little legal authority or commentary currently exists regarding the tax conse-
quences of the ownership and clean-up of environmentally damaged properties."). See gener-
ally Sloane E. Anders, Note, The Federal Tax System and the Environment: Should Pay-
ments Made Pursuant to CERCLA Be Deductible?, 10 VA. TAX REV. 707 (1991). This author 
could find no federal decisions, and only one state decision, dealing with the tax consequences 
of remediating contaminated property. In Inmar Assocs., Inc. v. Borough of Carlstadt, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that it would not determine the value of polluted land for 
tax assessment purposes simply by deducting the amount of estimated cleanup costs from the 
value of unpolluted land. See 549 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1988). The court reasoned that the costs of 
cleanup were analogous to deferred maintenance, because the owners could have spent more 
money to reduce the amount of contamination but instead had deferred the cost of cleanup 
until the present time. Id. at 42--43. While the court did not provide a definitive approach, it 
suggested in dicta that the costs of remediating contaminated property be treated as a capital 
improvement to be depreciated over the beneficial life of the property. Id. at 45. The case did 
not involve a prospective purchaser that was seeking to remediate property it had no role in 
contaminating. 
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CLA provides that responsible parties are potentially liable for haz-
ardous substance releases that injure or destroy natural resources. 147 
It is unclear whether payments of natural resources damages are 
deductible under the Code. 148 Code section 162(a) allows a deduction 
for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during 
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business," but section 
162(f) disallows any deduction for fines and penalties paid to gov-
ernment entities. 149 According to one commentator, payments for 
natural resources damages under CERCLA should not be construed 
as nondeductible fines or penalties under section 162(f).150 She ar-
gued that the cleanup costs a business incurs differ from fines or 
penalties in that businesses do not pay cleanup costs to the govern-
ment except to reimburse the government for its cleanup expen-
147 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); see also Anders, supra note 146, at 710-11. 
148 See Anders, supra note 146, at 712-21. 
149 1. R. C. § 162(a), (f) (1988). 
150 See Anders, supra note 146, at 712-21. The commentator conceded that the analogous 
case law under other environmental statutes is far from clear. Id.; see, e.g., True v. United 
States, 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990) (civil penalties under Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act for oil leaks are nondeductible); Colt Indus. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
1989) (fines imposed under Clean Water Act (CWA) and Clean Air Act (CAA) are nondeduc-
tible); see also Rev. Rul. 88-46, 1988-1 C.B. 76, 77 (IRS held that nonconformance penalty 
assessed by EPA against manufacturer of truck engines for failure to comply with CAA 
§ 206(g)(I) was deductible under I.R.C. § 162); Evan Slavitt, An Overview of the Tax Impli-
cations of Environmental Litigation, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,547, 10,548-52 
(Dec. 1990). 
A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth noting that 
Congress might intervene if a court were to hold that payments of natural resources damages 
are tax-deductible. For example, public furor over reports that Exxon could deduct its costs 
in cleaning up the Alaska oil spill has generated several proposed bills in Congress to disallow 
deductions for costs connected to oil and hazardous substance cleanup. See Steele, supra note 
146, at 1, 16, 24--32 (discussing S. 771, H.R. 1935, and H.R. 2060). 
A congressional study determined that the originally proposed settlement of the Exxon 
Valdez case would cost Exxon less than half of the $1.1 billion agreed upon in criminal and 
civil penalties, because the company would be able to deduct the civil penalties from its income 
taxes; only the originally proposed $100-million criminal fine would have been nondeductible. 
Deductions Limit Exxon's Settlement Costs to About $500 Million, Hill Researchers Say, 21 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2083, 2083-84 (Mar. 22, 1991). A federal judge rejected the first proposed 
criminal plea bargain that was the basis of the settlement on the grounds that it was too 
lenient. Allanna Sullivan, Federal, State Officials Look to Salvage Exxon Plea Bargain 
Rejected by Judge, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 26, 1991, at A3, col. 2. Exxon since has agreed to pay 
an additional $25 million in criminal fines, for a total of $125 million in criminal penalties, and 
a federal judge has accepted the plea agreement, ending two years of litigation. See Federal 
Judge Accepts $1 Billion Settlement, Ends Two-Year Litigation in Exxon Oil Spill, 22 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1533, 1533--34 (Oct. 11, 1991) (Exxon actually paid $250 million in criminal fines 
and restitution, but Justice Department forgave $125 million of that total); see also Exxon 
Agrees to Pay $1.125 Billion to Settle Litigation Over Valdez Spill, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 
1403, 1403-04 (Oct. 4, 1991). 
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ses. 151 Thus, section 162(f)'s bar on deductions for fines and penalties 
should not apply to cleanup expenses, because unlike payments of 
natural resources damages made under CERCLA, cleanup expenses 
are not "fines or penalties. "152 
Commentators have agreed that it is difficult to determine 
whether cleanup expenditures under CERCLA are deductible as 
ordinary and necessary business expenses under Code section 162(a) 
or whether they must be capitalized. 153 To be deductible under sec-
tion 162(a), a business expense must be both "ordinary" and "nec-
essary;" however, section 263 limits the scope of section 162 by 
prohibiting a deduction for "[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings 
or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase 
the value of any property or estate. "154 The purpose of sections 162 
and 263 is to prevent taxpayers from deducting in one tax year 
amounts paid to acquire assets that will remain useful for more than 
one year.155 If one regards cleanup costs as improving, altering, or 
increasing the value of a parcel of uncontaminated property, then 
these costs should be capitalized; if, however, one views these ex-
penditures as merely correcting a defect in the property-neither 
increasing nor improving the property's life-or adapting the prop-
erty for a different use, then they should be deductible as ordinary 
and necessary business expenses. 156 Even the one commentator who 
has argued that cleanup expenses should be deductible has acknowl-
edged that there is no clear line distinguishing capital expenditures 
from currently deductible business expenses. 157 
Requiring a purchaser of contaminated property to capitalize its 
cleanup expenses rather than currently deduct them results in sig-
nificant tax disadvantages for the taxpayer-purchaser. If the costs 
of investigation and cleanup are considered capital expenditures, the 
taxpayer-purchaser must add these costs to its basis in the prop-
erty.l58 Because the taxpayer-purchaser makes such expenditures to 
clean up land that has no measurable useful life, these monies may 
161 See Anders, supra note 146, at 721. 
162 [d. 
163 Compare Steele, supra note 146, at 11-12 (suggesting cleanup expenditures may have 
to be capitalized) with Anders, supra note 146, at 707-30 (cleanup expenditures probably can 
be deducted, although good case can be made for capitalization). 
164 I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 263(a)(I) (1988); see also Steele, supra note 146, at 8-13 (discussing 
I.R.C. §§ 162 and 263); Anders, supra note 146, at 721-29 (discussing §§ 162 and 263). 
166 See Anders, supra note 146, at 722. 
166 [d. 
167 See id. at 729. 
168 See Steele, supra note 146, at 11. 
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not qualify for a deduction through depreciation or amortization. 159 
Instead, they may provide a tax benefit, if at all, only upon the sale 
of the property. 160 
Depending upon whether cleanup expenses are deductible or must 
be capitalized, the current tax system may not encourage prospec-
tive purchasers seriously to consider buying and remediating con-
taminated properties. 161 One solution would be to allow the prospec-
tive purchaser of a contaminated site, but not any of the parties 
responsible for contamination, to deduct the cleanup costs it incurs 
in each tax year. Another possibility is to allow a prospective pur-
chaser to rapidly amortize its cleanup costs. Section 169 of the Code 
allows taxpayers that own certain certified water or air pollution 
control facilities to amortize their costs over a period of sixty 
'69 See id. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski has proposed 
to change the tax treatment of intangibles by establishing a 14-year amortization period. 
'Winners and Losers' in Rosty's Intangibles Bill, 52 TAX NOTES 982,982 (Aug. 26, 1991). It 
is unclear what impact this bill, H.R. 3035, would have upon cleanup deductions. 
It is also worth noting that I.R.C. § 468, which provides a current deduction for the costs 
of reclaiming waste sites and closing mines, specifically excludes any waste site that the 
taxpayer disturbs after the EPA has listed the site on the NPL. I.R.C. § 468(d)(2)(B)(ii) 
(1988); see also Richard A. Westin & Sanford E. Gaines, The Relationship of Federal Income 
Taxes to Toxic Wastes: A Selective Study, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 753, 782 (1989) 
("This exclusion has the effect of barring a current deduction for response or remediation 
costs required under the Superfund program for NPL sites ... "). Congress did not address, 
however, whether a prospective purchaser or other person who had no role in creating 
hazardous contamination ought to benefit from § 468. 
Another issue, beyond the scope of this Article, is the timing of CERCLA deductions for 
"accrual basis" taxpayers. Where several PRPs enter into a settlement under the terms of 
which they pay money into an escrow account or other trust fund for remediation purposes, 
they may not spend these monies for a lengthy amount of time. Therefore, questions arise as 
to when the obligation has "accrued," and when economic performance has occurred as the 
result of payment being made. See Mark W. March & Julia K. Brazelton, Superfund Cleanups: 
The Financial Costs High, the Tax Treatment Uncertain, 69 TAXES 682, 682-88 (1991) 
(arguing that PRP paying EPA for cost of cleaning up Superfund site should be able to deduct 
that payment as business expense because economic performance has occurred when taxpayer 
pays EPA, and because Superfund liabilities are payment liabilities under proposed regulations 
for I.R.C. § 461); Slavitt, supra note 150, at 10,553--54. See generally Thomas H. Yancey, 
Proposed Regulations Under the Internal Revenue Code Affect the Time of Deduction for 
Superfund Cleanup Costs, 21 CHEM. WASTE LITIG. REP. 573 (Mar. 1991) (discussing proposed 
treasury regulations to I.R.C. § 461 found at 55 Fed. Reg. 23,235 (1990), and arguing that 
economic performance occurs when payment is made to special settlement funds). In general, 
under either I.R.C. § 461 or § 468B, payments must be irrevocable and under the control of 
someone other than the taxpayer for economic performance to occur. A settling PRP, however, 
is often either a trustee of the cleanup trust fund or a PRP committee member with the power 
to give directions to the trustees. Slavitt, supra note 150, at 10,554. Still another problem is 
that settling PRPs often retain reversionary rights in any funds remaining after the cleanup. 
Id. 
'60 See Steele, supra note 146, at 11-12. 
'6' See supra notes 100-17 and accompanying text. 
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months. 162 A short amortization period would encourage prospective 
purchasers, because under the current tax code, there are relatively 
long amortization periods for most capital expenditures. 163 
Accordingly, a direct deduction or rapid amortization would pro-
vide greater incentives for efficiency than would a dollar-for-dollar 
tax credit, because prospective purchasers of contaminated property 
would bear part of the costs of remediation and therefore seek to 
minimize those costs. There is still, however, the problem of the 
transaction costs involved in policing by the EPA or Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) against tax fraud. Moreover, the prospects of 
getting Congress and the president to approve either a deduction or 
rapid amortization proposal are slim in the near future. 
C. Impact and Linkage Fees 
Martin has proposed the use of impact or linkage fees on new 
commercial development to fund cleanups of contaminated prop-
erty.l64 In essence, she proposes that a developer pay an "exaction," 
or contribution, to a municipality as a condition of building its proj-
ect. 165 The most common and least controversial type of exaction is 
a municipal requirement that a developer "dedicate" land within its 
development for streets, sidewalks, water and sewer lines, parks, 
or schools. 166 In those circumstances in which a developer lacks land 
suitable for dedication, a municipality may require the developer to 
pay a fee in lieu of dedication, to accomplish the same purpose. A 
municipal ordinance could limit the use of such fees to the acquisition 
of a park or construction of a school that primarily, although not 
exclusively, will benefit the residents of the new development. 167 
Martin's proposal, however, is not concerned with these two types 
of exactions, which courts usually uphold as reasonable exercises of 
the police power regarding land use regulation. She focuses on two 
more controversial types of exaction: "impact" fees and "linkage" 
162 I.R.C. § 169 (1988). For example, § 169 is restricted to plants that were in operation 
before January 1, 1976: a policy that is counterproductive in that it does not provide an 
incentive to build more expensive facilities that may exceed current standards. See Westin & 
Gaines, supra note 159, at 767-72. 
163 See Westin & Gaines, supra note 159, at 770 (explaining that despite its limitations, 
I.R.C. § 169 provides for more rapid amortization than most other forms of capital expendi-
tures pursuant to 1986 Tax Reform Act). 
164 Martin, supra note 12, at 9-10. 
166 See Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions: From 
Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 70 (1987) (defining "exaction"). 
166 Id. 
167 I d. at 71. 
----------
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fees. 168 In some cases, the improvement of a municipality's capital 
infrastructure is necessary to accommodate the new residents of a 
developer's project as well as continue to serve existing residents 
who live beyond the boundaries of the developer's project. 169 For 
example, the municipality may need to improve its water treatment 
or road system to accommodate problems resulting from growth in 
the community. If that municipality lacks sufficient revenues to fund 
such improvements, it may impose an impa~t fee on the developer 
in order to fund the improvements. 170 Courts are more likely to 
uphold an impact fee if the municipality can establish a proportionate 
relationship between the amount a developer must pay and the 
extent to which its project increases the cost of the municipal infra-
structure. 171 
Boston and San Francisco have developed linkage fee programs 
that require a developer of commercial office space to construct low-
and moderate-income housing on the theory that the construction of 
new office space generates a need for housing. 172 Courts may ques-
tion the constitutional appropriateness of linkage fees because such 
fees primarily accomplish social goals that are beyond a developer's 
direct costs. In addition, courts may balk because the imposition of 
these fees compels a developer to construct private facilities, 
whereas the first three types of exactions require the building of 
public facilities. 173 
Martin proposes that municipalities impose an impact or linkage 
fee-type requirement on commercial developers, requiring a devel-
oper to clean up a hazardous waste site in the municipality even if 
the developer's project has no relationship to the site or to hazardous 
waste. 174 If a community can demonstrate a link between a commer-
cial development and the cleanup of a particular site, according to 
Martin, it may be appropriate for the community to impose a re-
medial linkage fee on the development. 175 For example, if the de-
velopment requires housing, and only contaminated property is 
168 See id. at 70-72 (contrasting land dedications and in-lieu fees, which are widely accepted, 
with impact and linkage fees, which are more controversial). 
169 Id. at 71-72. 
170 Id. 
171 I d. at 72. 
172 See id.; R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community 
Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 
50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 25 (1987). 
173 See Connors & High, supra note 165, at 72. 
174 See Martin, supra note 12, at 9-10. 
175 Id. at 9. 
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available upon which to build that needed housing, then it could be 
proper to require the developer to acquire and clean up the contam-
inated property for housing as a condition for going forward with its 
development. 176 Moreover, the same linkage could apply to parks, 
schools, fire stations, and other public facilities if only contaminated 
land was available for their siting. 177 Martin did not discuss the issue 
of MSW landfill liability, but her linkage strategy could be adapted 
to require a developer either to remediate an old MSW landfill or to 
build a new MSW disposal facility if the new industrial or commercial 
development will generate significant amounts of MSW. 
Martin acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission178 raises ques-
tions about the required "nexus" between exactions and the public 
purpose. 179 In N ollan, the California Coastal Commission had con-
ditioned approval of a building permit for construction on beachfront 
property upon the property owner's grant of an easement providing 
lateral access to the ocean. l80 The Court concluded that there was 
no "essential nexus" between the exaction and the state's purpose 
of increasing visual access to the beach, and therefore held that the 
condition effected an unconstitutional taking. 181 Martin argued that 
Nollan is more likely to affect land dedications than impact fees, but 
conceded that a court would scrutinize the nexus between the need 
for a particular development project and any exaction to pay for 
cleanup costs. 182 
The problem with Martin's argument in favor oflinkage and impact 
fees is the difficulty a municipality faces in proving that an essential 
nexus exists between a proposed development and the remediation 
of a contaminated site when the developer does not plan to use the 
176 [d. at 9-10. 
177 [d. 
178 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
179 Martin, supra note 12, at 10. A number of commentators have examined the nexus test 
set forth in Nollan. See, e.g., Peter F. Neronha, Note, A Constitutional Standard of Review 
for Permit Conditions, Exactions and Linkage Programs: Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission, 30 B.C. L. REV. 903, 933-34 (1989) (under Nollan, there must be clear link between 
exaction and developer's project); see also infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text. 
180 483 U.S. at 828; see also Steven J. Lemon et al., Comment, The First Applications of 
the Nollan Nexus Test: Observations and Comments, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 585, 602-04 
(1989). 
181 483 U.S. at 838-39. 
182 Martin, supra note 12, at 10. How courts will apply the Nollan nexus test in the context 
of other types of municipal linkage and exaction fees remains uncertain, so Martin's argument 
is as good as any until the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, clarify this issue. 
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site itself for the development. l83 It is highly possible for courts to 
find that N olla'l1r-and even prior cases sanctioning exactions, for 
example, for low-income housing-does not support linkage between 
commercial development and the cleanup of a contaminated site 
unless the developer plans to build on the contaminated site itself, 
or the contaminated site is the only possible location for a needed 
public facility.l84 For example, San Francisco requires developers 
who wish to build on the city's eastern waterfront to perform soil 
tests and clean up a site, if necessary, to obtain a builder's permit. 185 
This type of linkage is clearly appropriate to prevent the spread of 
contamination to other sites as the result of proposed development. 
While contamination of industrial and commercial property is a se-
rious and widespread problem, however, it is unlikely that the only 
site in an entire municipality for low-income housing or a school 
would be a contaminated site. 
Even if courts endorse Martin's approach, it may not be wise from 
a policy standpoint, because the type of linkage fee that Martin 
proposes may involve high transaction costs. Developers are likely 
to litigate attempts at linking their projects with the cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites, and such litigation could be very costly to 
municipalities, whether they win or lose. Furthermore, Martin's 
linkage scheme does not address the problem of building new haz-
ardous and solid waste disposal facilities at a time when there is a 
serious shortage of places to dispose of both hazardous and solid 
waste. 186 In section V, this Article argues that it makes more sense 
in terms of linkage to have developers of waste disposal facilities, 
who presumably have expertise in this area, to remediate and reuse 
orphan and landfill MSW sites. 
This Article has examined three types of economic incentives that 
could involve developers in cleaning up contaminated property. 
183 See generally Robert Collin & Michael Lytton, Linkage: An Evaluation arui Explora-
tion, 21 URB. LAW. 413 (1989) (discussing Boston and San Francisco linkage requirements 
and their fate in light of Nollan); Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, arui Regulatory 
Takings: The Developer's Perspective, 20 URB. LAW. 515 (1988). 
184 See generally supra notes 164-83 and accompanying text. 
185 Michael F. Reilly, Transformation at Work: The Effect of Environmental Law on Larui 
Use Control, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 33, 72-73 (1989). 
186 See, e.g., Phillip A. Davis, Reauthorization Is New Front for the Garbage Wars, 49 
CONG. Q., 979, 979-80 (1991) (congressional efforts to reauthorize RCRA stymied by state 
efforts to bar hazardous and solid wastes); Bradford C. Mank, Out-of-State Trash: Solid Waste 
arui the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 25, 25 n.l (1990); 
Rose Gutfeld, As Eastern Laruifills Reach Capacity, States Serui Garbage West, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 26, 1991, at AI, col. 1 (discussing solid waste crisis); see also infra notes 187-90 and 
accompanying text. 
272 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:239 
Stroup's auction system, cleanup tax credits, and tax deductions for 
cleanup expenditures all could encourage a private party to pur-
chase, remediate, and develop a contaminated orphan or MSW land-
fill site. On the other hand, Martin's exactions proposal would force 
developers of commercial property to assist municipalities in cleaning 
up contaminated sites. In section IV, this Article discusses whether 
mediation and arbitration techniques can facilitate good decisions 
regarding the siting of waste disposal facilities. While disposal facil-
ity siting and waste site cleanup are seemingly unrelated, this Article 
contends that a potential "host" community and a developer of a 
proposed waste disposal facility should negotiate over whether the 
developer may clean up a contaminated site in the municipality as 
partial compensation for the opportunity to build its facility. 
IV. SITING AND NEGOTIATED COMPENSATION: EXISTING 
SCHEMES 
In recent years, it has become increasingly difficult to site certain 
types of projects such as airports, prisons, highways, MSW landfills 
and hazardous waste disposal facilities. 187 A phenomenon popularly 
known as the "NIMBY syndrome" is one of the major causes of these 
difficulties. 188 After Love Canal, Times Beach, and Three Mile Is-
land, the public generally has less confidence in the ability of scien-
tific experts and government bureaucrats to manage technological 
risk. 189 Subsequently, while there is a growing shortage of space in 
which to dispose of hazardous waste and MSW, fierce opposition is 
likely whenever someone attempts to site a new disposal facility for 
either type of waste. 190 
187 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at vii; Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and 
the Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 437, 437--38; Tarlock, 
supra note 3, at 429. But see infra note 249 and accompanying text. 
188 See Brion, supra note 187, at 438; Delogu, supra note 3, at 198; Bernd Holznagel, 
Negotiation and Mediation: The Newest Approach to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 13 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 329, 337 (1986). . 
189 See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 265-67; Brion, supra note 187, at 451; Mary R. 
English, The Search for Political Authority in Massachusetts' Toxic Waste Management Law, 
16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 39, 41 (1988); Reilly, supra note 185, at 68-72. 
190 See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 265-67; Brion, supra note 187, at 437-47; 
English, supra note 189, at 41 n.12 ("The Massachusetts experience is not unique; nationally, 
at least fifty percent of the proposals made under state hazardous waste facility siting programs 
have failed.") (footnote omitted). 
In spite of the high demand for hazardous waste facilities, a 1984 report by the 
Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council ... shows that, pur-
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Massachusetts is one of several states that have attempted to use 
alternative dispute resolution techniques-particularly negotiation 
over the amount of compensation owed to a community that "hosts" 
a waste disposal facility-to overcome NIMBY opposition to the 
siting of hazardous and solid waste disposal facilities. 191 To date, 
"negotiated compensation" has had a mixed record of success. 192 In 
many cases, it has failed to overcome public concerns about a facil-
ity's impacts on health, safety, and the environment. 193 This failure 
suggests that developers of waste disposal facilities should address 
public concerns about the safety of their projects. 
A developer may be able to bolster its credibility about building 
a safe waste disposal facility if it offers to clean up a contaminated 
site in the municipality where it wants to build. Given the potentially 
huge expense involved in restoring contaminated property, the de-
veloper also can provide a significant economic incentive by agreeing 
to clean up, for example, an MSW landfill site that the municipality 
otherwise would have to clean up. This Article proposes that devel-
opers of new hazardous and solid waste disposal facilities negotiate 
with municipalities to remediate an orphan or MSW landfill site in 
exchange for the municipality's promise of supporting the construc-
tion of the developer's proposed facility. This proposal may work 
where other efforts at negotiated compensation have failed if the 
suant to new state hazardous waste siting statutes, only eight facilities have been 
approved for operation in the United States. As of 1984, there have been thirty-two 
siting attempts: eighteen failed, three were still in court, three were in the process 
of approval, and only eight were approved. 
Holznagel, supra note 188, at 336 (footnote omitted); see also Tarlock, supra note 3, at 429. 
But see infra note 249 and accompanying text. 
191 See MASS GEN. L. ch. 21D, §§ 12--15 (1988); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-
114 to 34r (West 1985 & Supp. 1991) (statute providing communities with choice between 
fixed assessment and negotiated compensation with ceiling on total amount of compensation, 
and providing arbitration if negotiations fail); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.7 to -35 (1989 & Supp. 
1991) (statute providing negotiation and arbitration); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.43-.445 (West 
Supp. 1989) (statute providing voluntary mediation and binding arbitration by Waste Facility 
Siting Board if negotiations fail); Arthur J. Harrington, The Right to a Decent Burial: 
Hazardous Waste and Its Regulation in Wisconsin, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 223, 262--66 (1983) 
(discussing Wisconsin statute); Holznagel, supra note 188, at 329-78 (discussing Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin statutes). See generally Mary Beth Arnett, 
Comment, Down in the Dumps and Wasted: The Need Determination in the Wisconsin 
Landfill Siting Process, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 543. 
192 See Brion, supra note 187, at 447-48; English, supra note 189, at 41; see also supra 
note 190 and accompanying text; infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text. But see infra 
note 249 and accompanying text. 
193 See Brion, supra note 187, at 447-52; English, supra note 189, at 41. 
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public believes that the developer can perform the remediation more 
quickly and at less expense to the public purse. 
A. Negotiated Compensation 
Recognizing that the various approaches of other states had failed 
to overcome NIMBY opposition to hazardous and solid waste facili-
ties, the Massachusetts legislature in 1980 enacted a negotiated 
compensation statute, the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility 
Siting Act. l94 Some states had established statewide siting boards 
with the power to preempt local zoning and other land use ordinances 
designed to bar controversial facilities. 195 Experience has demon-
strated, however, that preemption alone does not diffuse local op-
position and in fact may intensify it. 196 Local officials may put pres-
sure on state officials to block a project even if a statewide siting 
board is willing to approve the proposed facility.197 Local officials 
and residents, through the legal process or by extralegal means, can 
delay a project until pursuing it becomes economically futile for its 
developer. 198 
Scholars at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and 
Harvard University created the concept of negotiated compensation 
and later drafted the Massachusetts statute to address what they 
perceived as a defect in the democratic process. l99 Let us assume 
that the benefits of a hazardous waste disposal facility outweigh the 
disadvantages. These benefits, however, are spread among many 
194 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 182; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 273-74; Hoiznagel, 
supra note 188, at 354-55. 
195 See, e.g., MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (1989 & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 115A.28(2), (3) (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05(3) (Anderson 
1988 & Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1446 (Michie 1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.43-
.445 (West 1989); see also Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 270-72 (discussing state statutes 
that preempt local zoning); Holznagel, supra note 188, at 348-50; Tarlock, supra note 3, at 
438-48; supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
196 See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 272-74; Hoiznagel, supra note 188, at 351-52. 
197 See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 272-74; Holznagel, supra note 188, at 351-52. 
198 See English, supra note 189, at 41; Hoiznagel, supra note 188, at 337; see also supra 
notes 187-90 and accompanying text. 
199 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 67-71; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 275-78; 
Holznagel, supra note 188, at 355-57. Michael O'Hare began his work on negotiated compen-
sation at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), continued it at Harvard, and was 
working for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts when Massachusetts adopted the statute; 
Lawrence Bacow was a faculty member at MIT while the legislature was developing the 
statute, and served on the siting council that the statute created; Debra Sanderson was a 
graduate student at MIT who worked for the Commonwealth while the legislature drafted 
the statute, and thereafter continued in state service. O'HARE, supra note 12, at vii-ix. 
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beneficiaries, including stockholders and customers, who each have 
only a small stake in the benefits and who therefore are unlikely to 
participate actively in the political process to support the project.200 
Opponents of the project are sometimes ideologically driven envi-
ronmentalist groups, but more often are local citizens who believe 
that the project will have a detrimental effect on their health and 
their property values.201 It is relatively simple to organize a strong 
NIMBY group, because residents in one municipality can put strong 
social pressure on their uncommitted friends and neighbors to join 
the groUp.202 In most circumstances, a developer will be unable to 
organize its project's potential beneficiaries, because the cost of 
organization will be high, and the developer may lack political legit-
imacy because of its perceived stake in the outcome. 203 Thus, a few 
citizens may be able to raise enough political opposition to block a 
project that has a net social benefit. Furthermore, even if the 
NIMBY group loses all of its battles in the courts or the political 
arena, it may win in the end if the delays resulting from its activities 
make the project a financial loser. 204 
Our representative democracy is poorly equipped to resolve con-
flicts that involve diffuse benefits for a large number of people at 
the expense of great losses for a particular community.205 Negotiated 
compensation attempts to solve this problem. It seeks to lessen local 
opposition by providing compensation to people who perceive that a 
project may harm them.206 Proponents of negotiated compensation, 
however, have been too optimistic and somewhat simplistic in as-
suming that money alone will convince local residents to accept a 
potentially dangerous project. It is important to realize that safety 
is not usually a negotiable issue. If local citizens believe, either 
rightly or wrongly, that a project is not safe, they will view offers 
of compensation as bribery attempts and likely will reject them. 207 
200 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 68-71; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 275-78; 
Holznagel, supra note 188, at 355-57. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEC-
TIVE ACTION-PUBLIC GoODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
201 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 68-71. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. 
204 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
206 See LESTER THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 11-18 (1980); Katherine R. Shanabrook, 
Note, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility Sitir/{/s: Negotiatir/{/ a Role for the 
Public, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 219, 230 (1987). 
206 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 67-71; Holznagel, supra note 188, at 355. 
207 See DOUGLAS J. AMY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 190 (1987); 
Shanabrook, supra note 205, at 231. 
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A developer, as well as the government officials supporting a project, 
must gain the trust of a substantial majority of these citizens by 
providing timely and accurate information about the risks associated 
with the project and the steps the developer is taking to reduce 
those risks. 208 
There are several types of compensation that a developer of a 
waste disposal facility may offer a local community.209 First, the 
developer can take preventative measures to avoid or reduce the 
likelihood that the facility will have adverse impacts on the com-
munity. For instance, the developer could install a groundwater 
monitoring system, double liners, and a leachate collection system 
to prevent any hazardous substances from escaping the facility and 
entering the groundwater. Second, the developer can implement 
measures to reverse or mitigate any adverse impacts that do occur. 
The developer might agree to provide money or equipment to im-
prove fire and police response capabilities in case of an accident, or 
to place buffers of vacant land around the facility to protect neigh-
bors in the event of a fire or explosion at the facility. 
Third, there are numerous compensatory benefits that the devel-
oper may give to either the municipal government or affected indi-
viduals.210 The developer may provide tax benefits to the municipal-
ity or direct cash payments to individuals.211 Another relatively rare 
means of allaying the concerns of residents is to guarantee property 
values or provide insurance to do SO.212 Such guarantees, however, 
can be very expensive, and developers are likely to place upper 
limits on their liability.213 A developer also may offer in-kind com-
pensation by, for example, providing a park if its proposed facility 
will occupy formerly scenic land. Finally, the developer of a hazard-
ous waste disposal facility or MSW landfill may have special technical 
expertise in waste site remediation and can offer to clean up an 
208 SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES: A HANDBOOK 11-12 (1983) 
[hereinafter SITING]. This handbook was a collaborative effort by the Conservation Founda-
tion, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, and the National Audubon Society. 
209 ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 112-13; O'HARE, supra note 12, at 72-73; Holznagel, supra 
note 188, at 356. 
210 See ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 112-13; O'HARE, supra note 12, at 72-73; Holznagel, 
supra note 188, at 356. 
211 See ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 112-13; O'HARE, supra note 12, at 72-73; Holznagel, 
supra note 188, at 356. 
212 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 86; SITING, supra note 208, at 17-18; see also infra note 
213 and accompanying text. 
213 See SITING, supra note 208, at 17-18. But see O'HARE, supra note 12, at 86 (taking 
more optimistic view of willingness of developers to guarantee property values). 
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abandoned site in exchange for permission to develop that site or 
another property. 214 
A state can take several approaches to determining compensation. 
Its legislature can establish a formula such as Connecticut's limit of 
2.5% of quarterly gross receipts over $2.5 million.215 There is a 
serious question, however, as to whether legislative formulas based 
on a fixed percentage of receipts are flexible enough to adapt to 
varying circumstances.216 In the alternative, a statewide siting board 
could make an administrative determination regarding the amount 
of compensation on a case-by-case basis; however, it is difficult for 
the government to set values in the absence of a free market, and 
there can be high transaction costS. 217 Lastly, the developer and the 
community simply can negotiate the amount of compensation. 218 
B. Critiques of Negotiated Compensation 
Some commentators have criticized the Massachusetts negotiated 
compensation model on the grounds that it is coercive, does not 
adequately represent local citizens, and fails to address safety con-
cerns. 219 These critiques of negotiated compensation best can be 
understood as part of a broader attack on the use of mediation to 
resolve environmental disputes. Accordingly, it will be helpful to 
examine mediation. 
Mediation is different from other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution, such as arbitration, because of its voluntary nature and 
its focus on achieving a consensus among the parties.220 A mediator 
tries to improve communication among the participants without 
pushing her own ideas on them.221 By contrast, arbitration may be 
compulsory, may involve a quasi-trial, and usually results in a deci-
sion by one or more neutral factfinders rather than a negotiated 
214 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
215 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-128 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990); see also Holznagel, 
supra note 188, at 373-74 (discussing Connecticut formula). 
216 O'HARE, supra note 12, at 84-85. 
217 See id. at 85. 
218 See id. at 85-86; Holznagel, supra note 188, at 374; Jeff Bailey, Economics of Trash, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1991, at AI, A9 (benefits from presence of landfills in localities vary 
greatly depending on localities' bargaining skills and fees). 
219 See, e.g., AMY, supra note 207, at 149-53, 189-90, 216-19; Brion, supra note 187, at 
447-52. 
220 See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CON-
SENSUAL ApPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 162-65 (1987). 
221 See id. at 163. 
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settlement that the parties themselves achieve.222 Disputants have 
used mediation to resolve a wide range of disputes including various 
types of environmental controversies.223 
Massachusetts and other states adopting the negotiated compen-
sation approach have engendered a great deal of controversy over 
the fact that their statutes essentially force a developer and a host 
community to mediate their dispute successfully.224 Typically, these 
statutes require that, if mediation fails, either a state siting board 
or an arbitrator-and not the concerned parties--make the final 
decision about siting.225 In addition, one leading scholar on environ-
mental mediation, Douglas Amy, has argued that negotiated com-
pensation is not true mediation because negotiated compensation 
statutes do not leave to interested parties the choice about whether 
to employ mediation. 226 
At its best, mediation offers the possibility that affected citizens 
and other interests, together with local officials, can reach a political 
solution to a siting controversy rather than leave the decisionmaking 
process to the judiciary, an administrative bureaucracy, or an arbi-
trator.227 Mediators usually seek to include representatives from all 
significant interest groups, and their success in getting parties to 
the table may determine the likelihood of success.228 In 1974, several 
interest groups supporting the proposed construction of the West-
way highway project in New York City hired an experienced media-
tor to help resolve difficulties in the project's progress.229 They in-
vited a wide spectrum of other interest groups to participate. The 
222 See id. 
223 See, e.g., GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF 
EXPERIENCE xvii-xix (1986) (discussing growing trend toward mediation in resolving disputes 
in environmental politics). See generally AMy, supra note 207; SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, 
supra note 220; Joseph P. Tomain, Land Use Mediation for Planners, 7 MEDIATION Q. 163 
(1989) (mediation provides alternative to litigation for land use disputes). 
224 See AMY, supra note 207, at 216-19. 
225 See id. In Connecticut and Wisconsin, the state siting board has the final decision if the 
host community resists negotiation, whereas in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, an indepen-
dent arbitrator makes the final decision. See Holznagel, supra note 188, at 377. 
226 See AMY, supra note 207, at 146-fi3. 
227 See Douglas J. Amy, Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Promise and the Pitfalls, 
in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s 211, 215-20 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft 
eds., 1990) [hereinafter 1990s]. But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 
1073, 1076-78 (1984) (criticizing ADR movement and arguing that courts are better equipped 
to protect constitutional rights of minorities); David Schoenbrod, Limits and Dangers of 
Environmental Mediation: A Review Essay, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1453, 1470-71 (1983) (me-
diation can involve delegation of public duties and result in dilution of statutory mandates). 
228 See SITING, supra note 208, at 8-11; Daniel Riesel, Negotiation and Mediation of 
Environmental Disputes, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 99, 104-08 (1985). 
229 Riesel, supra note 228, at 105. 
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mediation failed, however, in part because the Mayor and Governor 
of N ew York refused to join the mediation process.230 In the context 
of siting waste facilities, another important consideration is whether 
to include representatives from nearby communities that may suffer 
as a result of increased traffic, odor, or risk of harm to human health 
and the environment, but receive no tax benefits. 2,'31 
One difficult issue for parties considering mediation is whether 
some of the parties to a dispute should proceed with the mediation 
if the other parties refuse to be bound by any resulting agreement. 
For example, in 1976, a long dispute involving the siting of an 
interstate highway in Seattle, Washington, had reached an impasse, 
and the governor of Washington asked state transportation officials 
and political leaders from opposing communities in the proposed path 
of the highway to mediate their differences.232 The parties decided 
to mediate the dispute despite the refusal of important environmen-
tal groups to be bound by the results of the process.233 State and 
local officials eventually accepted a compromise agreement, and the 
environmental groups failed in their legal challenge to the project's 
final environmental impact statement (FEIS) at least in part because 
the mediated settlement was included in the FEIS.234 
Although mediation has been effective in resolving a variety of 
environmental disputes, including siting controversies, it is impor-
tant to recognize that not all such disputes are amenable to media-
tion.235 There is considerable scholarly controversy over whether 
mediation resolves disputes more quickly and at less cost than liti-
gation. Because each case is different, it has been impossible to make 
scientifically rigorous comparisons between alternative dispute res-
olution and traditional litigation. 236 
230 See id. at 106. 
231 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 7; Holznagel, supra note 188, at 362 (noting that under 
title 990, § 8.02(1)(g) of Massachusetts Administrative Code, chief executive officer of host 
community can invite up to four people from abutting communities to be members of local 
assessment committee). 
232 ALLAN R. TALBOT, SETTLING THINGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIA-
TION 33 (1983). 
233 [d. 
234 [d. at 38. 
235 Compare BINGHAM, supra note 223, at 72-73 (analyzing 132 mediations, including 86 
cases involving land use disputes, and arguing that mediation led to successful resolutions 
78% of time) and Richard C. Collins, The Emergence of Environmental Mediation, 10 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. vi-x (1990) (director of Institute for Environmental Negotiation at University 
of Virgina discussing program's success) with AMY, supra note 207, at 215-16 (agreeing with 
Gerald Cormick, leader in field of environmental mediation, who estimates that only 10% of 
environmental disputes are suitable for mediation). 
236 See Joseph P. Tomain & Jo Ann Lutz, A Model for Court-Annexed Mediation, 5 OHIO 
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An important issue in this controversy has been the extent to 
which the mediation process can overcome differences among parties 
in monetary, technical, and informational resources. Should a me-
diator attempt to assure a level playing field, or should she let the 
balance of power among the participants decide the outcome? Critics 
of mediation have emphasized that the informal atmosphere of me-
diation may fool less sophisticated parties, such as citizen groups, 
and lead them to accept a less favorable resolution than they could 
have achieved through litigation. 237 Conversely, these critics charge, 
other parties or even the mediator may coerce less capable parties 
into entering an unwise settlement.238 Moreover, for many citizen 
groups, individual citizens, and even municipalities, the costs of 
obtaining technical information or hiring an experienced negotiator 
may be too great, leaving most developers with a distinct advan-
tage. 239 In some cases, the public process of litigation may afford 
greater protection not only to minority interests, but also to the 
majority of the public, whose individual members lack the resources 
of industry or government bureaucracy. 240 
Another factor that potential parties to mediation must consider 
is confidentiality. Mediators almost universally recommend that dis-
cussions between a mediator and a party or among parties be con-
fidential and therefore exempt from discovery in subsequent litiga-
tion.241 In 1990, Congress enacted confidentiality requirements in the 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5-13 (1989) (existing scholarship is divided concerning success of 
alternative dispute resolution techniques). Compare BINGHAM, supra note 223, at xxv-xxvii 
(although costs of mediation are hard to compare to those of litigation, typical time to litigate 
environmental case in federal courts, from filing to conclusion of trial, is 23 months, while 
median time for environmental dispute resolution is five to six months) with AMy, supra note 
227, at 221-22 (questioning whether environmental dispute resolution is cheaper and faster 
than litigation) and Frank P. Grad, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Law, 
14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 157, 185 (1989) (noting that it is not clear whether ADR provides 
significant savings over litigation). 
237 See, e.g., Amy, supra note 227, at 223-24 (criticizing imbalance of power in environmental 
dispute resolution); J. Walton Blackburn, Environmental Mediation as an Alternative to 
Litigation, 16 POL'y STUD. J. 562, 568-72 (1988) (comparing mediation to litigation). But see 
Lawrence Susskind & Scott McCreary, Techniques for Resolving Coastal Resource Manage-
mentDisputes Through Negotiation, AM. PLAN ASS'N J., Summer 1985, at 365,365-73 (noting 
that ability of any party to walk out from negotiations creates balance of power). 
238 See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
239 See AMY, supra note 207, at 143; Riesel, supra note 228, at 109-10. 
240 See supra notes 227, 237-39 and accompanying text. 
241 See, e.g., Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: 
The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 37-39 (1986); Eric D. Green, A 
Heretical View of Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 1-2 (1986) (acknowl-
edging that most mediators favor blanket confidentiality and arguing for more limited media-
tor's privilege); Karen L. Liepman, Note, Confidentiality in Environmental Mediation: 
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Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, which governs mediation 
involving federal agencies.242 Critics charge that confidentiality laws 
violate the spirit of open democratic government. 243 
Defenders of mediation and negotiated compensation argue that 
parties should try mediation in cases where they cannot readily come 
to an agreement and expensive litigation looms.244 They note that a 
citizen group always can walk away from mediation if it believes 
that the process is unfair. 245 Furthermore, advocates of mediation 
contend that litigation is more expensive and time-consuming than 
mediation, and that overloaded courts do not necessarily reach better 
decisions or encourage more equitable settlements than mediators.246 
Massachusetts and the other states with statutes promoting ne-
gotiated compensation generally have failed to overcome public op-
position to siting hazardous and solid waste facilities. 247 Public fears 
about the safety of these facilities have been the biggest obstacle to 
siting, with economic and aesthetic concerns also major causes for 
opposition.248 Recently, however, some communities have been will-
ing to accept waste disposal facilities in exchange for compensation. 
Some scholars have called this nascent trend the "Yes-In-My-Back-
Yard" (YIMBY) syndrome. 249 In some cases, political leaders in a 
municipality initially have been interested in the potential economic 
benefits of a proposed waste facility, but have backed out of nego-
tiations in response to public uproar about safety concerns.250 Gen-
Should Third Parties Have Access to the Process?, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 93, 94-95 
(1986). 
242 PUB. L. No. 101-552, § 584, 104 Stat. 2736, 2740-41 (1990). 
243 See Tomain & Lutz, supra note 236, at 7 (central criticism of mediation is privatism and 
consequent reduction in publicity). 
244 See AMY, supra note 207, at 27-28. 
245 I d. at 38. 
246 Id. at 18-23, 26; Amy, supra note 227, at 215-20. 
247 See Brion, supra note 187, at 447-48; English, supra note 189, at 41; supra notes 190-
94 and accompanying text. But see infra note 249 and accompanying text. 
248 See Brion, supra note 187, at 450-51; see also supra notes 187-93, 207-08, 247 and 
accompanying text. 
249 See Daniel Mazmanian & David Morell, The "NIMBY" Syndrome: Facility Siting and 
the Failure of Democratic Discourse, in 1990s, supra note 227, at 125, 125-43 (discussing 
YIMBY approach of Southern California Hazardous Waste Management Authority); Katz, 
YIMBYism is Coming But . .. , 21 WASTE AGE 40, 40-41 (1990) (many communities are 
willing to.accept projects for guaranteed annual "host" fee, guaranteed property values, and 
various payments toward environmental improvements benefiting host community); Meyers, 
supra note 11, at 572; John A. Barnes, Learning to Love the Dump Next Door, WALL ST. J., 
June 25, 1991, at A18 (editorial describing success of landfill in Riverview, Michigan). But see 
supra notes 187-93, 207-08, 247-48 and accompanying text. 
250 See, e.g., YIMBY? Novel Plan Aims for a "Yes in My Backyard" Attitude on Noxious 
Sites, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 11, 1991, at Al (Browning-Ferris Industries and Yorkshire, New 
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erally, developers of hazardous and solid waste disposal facilities 
must do a better job of convincing the public that their projects are 
safe. They may be able to quell some doubts by emphasizing prev-
entative measures, although citizen opposition may remain wide-
spread even in light of strict safety measures. 251 
While economic incentives can be useful, the developer of a waste 
disposal facility that offers only cash compensation to a potential 
host community is unlikely to overcome public opposition. More often 
than not, developers of waste disposal facilities have failed to con-
vince anybody that a community would be at less risk by accepting 
a proposed facility. A mediator can assist a developer and a com-
munity in negotiating a compensation package that includes strin-
gent safety measures. In fact, a developer can improve a commu-
nity's health, safety, and environment by cleaning up a contaminated 
orphan or MSW landfill site and replacing it with a modern, secure 
waste disposal facility. Furthermore, if a developer cleans up an 
orphan or MSW landfill site, a community may reduce or eliminate 
a potentially large CERCLA liability. 
V. REMEDIATION AND REUSE: A NEW ApPLICATION FOR 
NEGOTIATED COMPENSATION 
While negotiated compensation does not work in all cases, a de-
veloper may be able to convince a community to accept a new waste 
disposal facility in exchange for the developer's conducting remedial 
actions at an orphan or MSW landfill site.252 Although the developer 
still would need to convince the community's residents that the 
proposed project was safe and worthwhile, the promise to remediate 
a toxic dump site endangering the entire municipality is a powerful 
selling point. Taxpayers who are facing an enormous bill for cleaning 
up their town's or county's MSW landfill site might be willing to 
accept a new waste disposal facility if the facility's developer as-
sumed part or all of the cleanup costs for the old landfill. Further-
more, the developer could emphasize that it can perform an effective 
cleanup more quickly and at less expense than the municipality, the 
state, or the EPA, and could argue that building a new facility is 
more safe than continuing to operate an old one. 
York negotiated for several months regarding landfill site, but town backed out as result of 
public opposition). 
251 See Meyers, supra note 11, at 572 n.36. 
262 See supra notes 15, 186 and accompanying text. 
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In some cases, it may be impossible to reuse a contaminated site, 
for instance because the site is located near an aquifer that supplies 
drinking water to public or private wells. A developer still could 
remediate the site in exchange for municipal support for siting its 
new facility. Whether the developer would pay the entire cost of the 
cleanup or part of the cost in conjunction with other parties would 
be left to negotiations. In addition, such negotiations could address 
whether the developer or the municipality would direct remediation 
efforts. By cleaning up old sites and creating less risky new facilities, 
developers and communities may be able, in the long run, to reduce 
NIMBY opposition and lower future CERCLA liability. 
While this Article suggests that negotiated compensation may be 
more politically practical than some types of incentive systems, it 
does not mean to suggest that there is no room for economic incen-
tives beyond those available in negotiated compensation. Stroup's 
proposed auction system and the concepts of tax credits, tax deduc-
tions, and exactions and linkage fees are not inherently incompatible 
with negotiated compensation. Under Stroup's system, a company 
that seeks to build a new hazardous waste disposal facility might 
acquire an old site at an EPA auction and then negotiate with the 
local government for permission to carry out its development plan. 
Depending upon the incentives provided in the Internal Revenue 
Code, either tax credits or tax deductions could encourage more 
developers of new facilities to acquire old sites rather than "virgin" 
sites. Voluntary negotiated compensation is conceptually at odds 
with enforced exactions and linkage fees, but large developers with 
choices about where to build commercial projects probably have 
some flexibility to negotiate over the number and type of exactions 
that they will accept before they turn to another city to locate the 
project. 
There are other economic incentives that states or the federal 
government could provide to improve the chances for successful 
negotiations. For example, some states provide low-interest loans 
to assist recipients financially in removing and replacing leaking 
underground storage tanks. 253 States or the federal government sim-
ilarly could provide loans to developers who pledge to reuse or clean 
263 See, e.g., Michigan Underground Storage Tank Financial Assurance Act, MICH. COMPo 
LAWS ANN. §§ 299.801-.828 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990); Minnesota Petroleum Tank Release 
Cleanup Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115C.01-.10 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); Tennessee Petro-
leum Underground Storage Tank Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-53-101 to 68-53-128 (Supp. 
1990); see also Martin, supra note 12, at 12-13 (discussing these three statutes). 
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up abandoned orphan or MSW landfill sites. Of course, in these tight 
fiscal times, legislatures may be reluctant to provide funding for 
such an untested program even if this type of loan might speed up 
waste site cleanups in their states. There are also various types of 
state and local property and income tax relief that could encourage 
reuse or remediation,254 but again, any such measures depend upon 
convincing political leaders that the measures are necessary and 
beneficial to the public interest. 
The most significant problem with negotiated compensation is its 
local focus. Groundwater pollution from an operating or abandoned 
waste facility may affect many communities beyond the one in which 
the facility is located,255 and once groundwater is contaminated, it 
may be impossible to restore its purity.256 As a result, some com-
munities have established aquifer protection zones.257 It is question-
able whether a local ordinance can solve such a regional problem. 
Because of the regional nature of pollution from waste disposal fa-
cilities, surrounding communities should have a greater role in ne-
gotiating compensation. The Massachusetts negotiated compensation 
statute permits a community that "hosts" a new facility to grant 
surrounding communities a role in negotiations and possibly in com-
pensation.258 States enacting statutes similar to that in Massachu-
setts could include similar provisions, and communities in states that 
do not adopt such a statute could invite their neighbors to partici-
pate, perhaps in exchange for the provision of certain municipal 
services or some other consideration. 259 
254 See generally Martin, supra note 12, at 6-8. 
255 See Corash & Behrendt, supra note 58, at 881 n.132 (single hazardous waste facility 
may contaminate entire geographic region by polluting aquifer, bay, or lake). 
256 See David Stipp, Super Waste?: Throwing Good Money at Bad Water Yields Scant 
Improvement, WALL. ST. J., May 15, 1991, at AI, col. 1; see also supra note 255 and 
accompanying text. An EPA official has stated that the agency will issue a policy statement 
spelling out when it is "technically impractical" to remove dense nonaqueous phase liquids, 
which are heavier than water and tend to sink through the water table, from groundwater. 
Policy on Remedy Selection to Address 'Impracticable' Ground Water Cleanups, 22 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1363, 1363-64 (Sept. 27, 1991). "The contaminants include semivolatile chemicals 
and halogenated volatile chemicals typically found in solvents, wood preserving wastes (in-
cluding creosote and pentachlorophenol), coal tars, and pesticides. They are of particular 
concern to the agency because they are frequently found at Superfund sites." Id. at 1363. 
257 See, e.g., Town of Washington, Dutchess County, New York, Zoning Law, art. II, § 314, 
Aquifer Protection Overlay District Regulations (adopted Dec. 27, 1989 and effective Jan. 1, 
1990) (adding aquifer protection overlay zone). For a discussion of the regional nature of 
aquifer contamination, see supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
258 See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
259 Achieving greater regional cooperation in negotiating with operators of new facilities 
and remediating hazardous waste sites may require a shift to a more regional tax base. St. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
While this Article proposes the use of negotiated compensation to 
encourage developers of new waste disposal facilities to reuse or at 
least clean up abandoned waste sites, the problems of siting and 
remediation are complex, and solving them will require a number of 
different approaches. In some cases, the EPA itself will have to 
conduct a cleanup of an abandoned site using Superfund monies. For 
many orphan sites, the uncertainties of remediation may be too great 
for any private developer to take the risk, regardless of the incen-
tives. Negotiated compensation will fail in many cases, including 
cases in which a developer offers to reuse or clean up an abandoned 
site. For problems as complex as remediating the nation's scores of 
old waste sites and developing the many needed, less risky, new 
facilities, however, creative solutions are necessary. 
Paul and Minneapolis, Minnesota have been part of a seven-county tax base sharing area since 
1971, and other communities have discussed implementing the tax base sharing concept. See 
Jack L. Dustin et aI., Tax Base Sharing: The Potential and Experience, in TAX BASE 
SHARING: AN EVALUATION OF ITS USE AND ITS POTENTIAL IN THE STATE OF OHIO 3,6-14 
(Jack L. Dustin- ed., 1990). See generally Note, Minnesota's Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities 
Act-An Experiment in Tax Base Sharing, 59 MINN. L. REV. 927 (1975). A full discussion of 
what role tax base sharing might have in improving regional cooperation to solve environ-
mental problems is beyond the scope of this Article. I wish to thank Charles Ellison and Sam 
Noe of the University of Cincinnati's School of Planning for alerting me to the concept of tax 
base sharing. 
